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ABSTRACT

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MONETARY ECONOMICS

by
BERNARD GAUCI
University of New Hampshire, May, 1981

The application of the work of I. Lakatos to economics suggests
that the neo-Walrasian monetary model is generated from a neoclassical
microeconomic research program, as is the rational expectations hypo
thesis.

At the macroeconomic level, there are competing Keynesian and

conservative programs.

The latter contains monetarism as a constituent

set of theories.
Methodological and policy-related debates reflect competition
between these three programs.

Despite the similarity between the policy

recommendations of monetarism and the rational expectations hypothesis,
their theoretical apparatus— dictated by the positive heuristic of
their respective programs— are substantially different.

Monetarism

shares its macroeconomic equipment with Keynesianism, but the two dif
fer in their policy recommendations.
A major characteristic of the neoclassical microeconomic program
is the situational determinism found in its member theories.

This in

turn follows from the substantive (rather than procedural) rationality
displayed by all economic agents in these theories.

ix

The same can be

said of the rational expectations hypothesis.

On the other hand,

macroeconomic theories, whether Keynesian or monetarist, display a
situational determinism only at the level of the policy-maker.

The

separation of economics from the other social sciences leads to a
situational logic which enables the policy-maker in these models to
reach decisions through the use of the substantive form of rationality.

x

INTRODUCTION

The literature has recently shown a proliferation of interest in
the methodology of economics.

Economics is commonly regarded as a

leader among the social sciences in the rigor of its mathematical
formulations and also because of the pioneering work in non-experimental
corroboration by econometricians.

As a result, economics has served as

a fertile ground for the application of a variety of approaches in the
philosophy of science.
A major recent development in the methodological literature has
involved Imre Lakatos' concept of competing scientific research programs.
This concept requires the condensation of an entire school of thought
to a set of propositions incorporating the fundamental principles of the
program together with a set of instructions for the construction of
theories.

The method used in the dissertation is to present these essen

tial ingredients for one program and later return to ascertain whether
a particular theory is compatible with these same ingredients.

If not,

a new program is suggested in which the theory is then placed as a con
stituent member.
The concept of the research program is discussed and evaluated in
the first chapter, as is the formulation of a neoclassical research
program as suggested by S. J. Latsis.

The letter's work is discussed

further in Chapter 2, in the context of an application to neoclassical
monetary theory.

The dissertation goes on, in Chapter 3, to justify

and then construct a separate Keynesian research program, which itself

1
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competes with the neoclassical microeconomic program.

Whether mone

tarism constitutes a separate program, or whether it belongs in some
larger program, is one of the subjects discussed in Chapter 4, which
deals with this question of identifying the important characteristics
of monetarism, and studying its links with other schools of thought.
The conclusion is reached that within the macroeconomic arena, the
Keynesian program competes with a conservative program.

A separate

section of Chapter 4 deals with the rational expectations hypothesis
(REH), which is contrasted with monetarism, and, like monetarism,
placed in the appropriate research program.

The REH is described as

appertaining to the neoclassical microeconomic program.

This disserta

tion therefore identifies two levels of program competition:

between

microeconomic and macroeconomic programs and,among macroeconomic
programs, between the Keynesian and conservative programs.
This is primarily an application of the Lakatosian method to
Keynesian and monetarist theories as well as the REH, with emphasis
throughout on monetary analysis.

It finds particular benefit in con

trasting the psychological assumptions underlying neoclassical, Keynes
ian and monetarist theory and the REH.

The relevance of this approach

to an understanding of monetary analysis is evaluated in the concluding
chapter.

CHAPTER 1

ECONOMIC METHOD

The process of building theoretical models in economics or else
where is variously described as an "abstraction" from, or "idealiza
tion" of reality.

Theory can be defined as the symbolic (or, more

loosely, the linguistic, mental or verbal) reproduction of what is per
ceived.

The ideal, but paradoxically the least useful, is the theory

which constitutes a mirror image of what the perceiver attempts to
portray.

Limitations of the intellectual capabilities of the theorist

stop the process well short of such a state of perfection. Indeed if
intellectual powers were perfect, symbolic reproduction in the form of
theoretical models would be unnecessary.

Instead, the theorist has to

make do with a less than perfect intellect and must apply his inadequate
equipment to a complex subject matter.

So he will limit himself to a

portion of his surroundings.
At the risk of ignoring significant relationships, the economist,
for example, will often exclude institutional or other social detail
from his purview.

This procedure, which one may label decomposition,

after Simon,''- is manifested in the division of the social sciences into
economics, sociology, anthropology, history and so on, with little sub
stantial interaction among these fields.

It is also evident within

economics where, for example, the microtheorist ignores macroeconomic
variables and vice versa, where the macrotheorist ignores microeconomic
detail, or where the monetary theorist assumes a closed economy.

3

Such
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a procedure may, in some instances, indicate a narrow-mindedness on the
part of the theorist, but is otherwise excused by the inadequacy of the
intellectual powers of the theorist.

In other words, decomposition may

be the only way to make a given problem tractable.

But the cost of

achieving this easy-way-out is the risk of inaccuracy, or erroneous
decomposition.

In some instances, the theorist may find himself in a

situation where the only reproduction he can make is distorted.
Among the admitted variables, the theorist will emphasize some
relationships and play down or ignore others.

Once again, the motiva

tion may be merely a need to make a symbolic reproduction possible.
For example, in Friedman’s interpretation of macroeconomic theory, the
Keynesian school ignores the determination of the price level and
assumes a fixed price level.^

(The quantity theorist adopts a similar

procedure for the level of output, although here the level of output
can be said to be determined by the separate, general-equilibrium
model.)

This process may be called specification, with the inherent

danger, of course, being that of misspecification.
Sometimes, then, a distorted theory may be the only theory attain
able.

That a distorted representation of reality is better than no

representation at all, or that one distorted presentation may be more
useful, and therefore better than another appears to be similar to the
position of such instrumentalists as Milton Friedman.

What determines

the validity of a theory is not the realism of its assumptions, but
rather the accuracy of its predictions.

Friedman explains:

A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the
mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the
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basis of them. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must
be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account
of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circustances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant
for the phenomena to be explained.3
This, in effect, is Friedman's justification for the techniques of
decomposition and specification.
Limitations on the intellectual power of the individual theorist
also require most, if not all, theoretical activity to be carried out
not by theorists in isolation, but by theorists as part of communities
of intellectuals.

If, for example, at the age of 35, somebody decides

to start studying economics, it is unlikely that he would attempt to
develop his own theory ah initio, but rather he would try to build upon
the work of his predecessors.

In the light of our earlier discussion,

it is by the very definition of economics almost impossible to really
start from scratch, since the very boundaries of economics were developed
by several generations of decompositional activity and are unlikely to
coincide with one's own decompositional tactics.
The idea of collegiality among scientists gained added recognition
after T. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.1^

So-called

normal science is carried out within a community which professes allegi
ance to a so-called paradigm.

The meaning of this last term is anything

but clear, but can be defined for our pruposes as agreed and unquestion
ed rules about decomposition and specification.

These rules severely

limit the range of questions addressed by the members of the paradigma
tic community.

The inability of the scientist to solve any of the

puzzles permitted by the paradigm will reflect poorly not on the profes
sion, but on the scientist.

In other words, the science with its

intrinsic methods of specification and decomposition is absolved from
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the problems and errors which these very methods may cause.
By Popper's criteria,-* science progresses through a chain of con
jectures and refutationsw

The advance of science is abetted by the

construction of theories which lend themselves to refutation.

Kuhn be

lieves, however, that the Popperian overthrow of theories occurs only
at intermittent stages.
science.

It never happens during periods of normal

The inability of scientists to solve a puzzle here and a

puzzle there does not shake the faith, but an accumulation of such
anomalies may lead to a switch to a new paradigm.

Such an event is

called a revolution, where a new and incommensurable paradigm comes to
rule the roost.

The abruptness of the switch, hardly evident in the

slow pace of change in the natural sciences, was toned down in the later
Kuhn to allow for an interregnum of pretender-paradigms.^
The paradigm, then, is the hallmark of true science, distinguished
by a unity of purpose and method in the profession.

This is a statement

of what science is, but there is a hint of how scientists should act, in
that in a paradigmatic science research is streamlined in a fruitful
direction.

There is no duplication of research efforts, since para

digmatic education enables scientists to communicate with ease.

In con

trast, during the preparadigmatic as well as the revolutionary period,
there is a plethora of research lines, all independent and lacking
channels of intercommunication.
called efficient.

Paradigmatic science can therefore be

On the other hand, it could be said to constitute a

dictator's paradise.

If the dictator executes all the dissidents, those

who survive will be scientists in the true Kuhnian sense of the word.
In other words, while descriptively the Kuhnian model might perform ade
quately, ominous results might follow if a college dean were to regard
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it as a source of prescriptive (or normative) inspiration.^
Yet even insofar as mere description is concerned, problems arise
in application to economics.

First of all, there is the question of

the geographical scope of the paradigm.

For example, in some of the

natural sciences there might be one universal paradigm, but hardly in
economics, where the Soviet paradigm, for example, is entirely differ
ent from the American paradigm.

It appears, then, that the paradigm in

economics may be less than universal.

Clearly, the majority of American

and British economists, with significant number of continental Europeans,
think alike, as it were, in a number of important ways.

While the para

digm cannot claim the membership of all the economists on earth, the
presence of Marxists, radicals and so on in the United States does not
imply that the concept of the paradigm cannot be applied at all.

These

minorities are well aware of the overwhelming predominance and power of
the majority, are conversant with the opinions of the majority, and a
significant portion of their academic activity consists precisely of
defending their position against the majority opinion.
Then what constitutes the present-day paradigm in western economics?
We might start by trying to identify all that is common to the majority.
Superficially, we can identify a body of knowledge learned by every
successful undergraduate, consisting of neoclassical price theory,
particularly the perfectly competitive model, and macroeconomic theory,
including primarily basic Keynesian theory.

Around the basic, perfectly

competitive model are derived rules for social optimization, and models
of imperfect competition.

Around the macroeconomic core are built

frameworks for the formulation and implementation of fiscal and monetary
policy.

The various parts may be contradictory at times, but a certain
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unity emerges in the flavor of policy recommendations.

Dominant

political thought among economists holds to the underlying desirability
of allowing market forces to dominate the economy, with all the benefits
of such a policy as suggested by microeconomic welfare theory.

That is

as much as can be said to be true of the beliefs of the mainstream.

A

monetarist is likely to hold the view with a very strong conviction; a
Keynesian would probably be more willing to propose state intervention.
Yet to both, operation of free or relatively free markets in significant
sections of the economy is acceptable and to both positions (as well as
to intermediate positions), paradigmatic economics provides the neces
sary theoretical background.

Both parties can undergo a common intel-

«

lectual training, and have a common language in which to debate their
paradigmatically-constrained differences.

This language includes

definitions of a wide range of theoretical terms and econometric techni
ques.

In addition, the professionality of the science precludes, to a

considerable extent, the development and diffusion of non-paradigmatic
economics.

On the other hand, the further elaboration and testing of

intra-paradigmatic issues is encouraged and professionally stimulated.
This method of identifying the paradigm is based on a particular
view of economics.

Rather than regard theoretical method and empirical

investigation as logically, if not chronologically, preceding policy
recommendations, I view method in economic theory, as well as econometric
method, as following from the school of thought which is itself defined
by the social, political or ideological flavor of its policy recommenda
tions.

Kuhn’s ideas cast doubt on the claim of some econometricians to

be the ultimate arbiters in the development of economic theories.

As

long as theorists and econometricians are inhibited by the paradigm,

g

the process of corroboration is not totally unconstrained.

Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program (SRP)
But what has been gained by viewing all of economics as being
encompassed by one paradigm?

Clearly, by our approach, a variety of

policy recommendations may well require a corresponding variety of
theories.

Instead of lumping the Keynesians and the monetarists

together, it might be more useful to recognize that the two schools com
pete with one another, even though there is some overlap between them.
The only way two schools can coexist in the Kuhnian framework is if the
science lies in a nonnormal state.
These kinds of issues are addressed by Lakatos.
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Instead of the

monolithic Kuhnian paradigm, Lakatos envisages competing research
programs, each of which may contain any number of theories.

For a

theory to belong to a particular program, it must be built upon a set
of propositions which constitute the hard core of the program.

Unlike

the rather vague concept of the "unwritten, but always-observed rules"
of the Kuhnian paradigm, the negative heuristic of the SRP instructs
the theorist to uphold the specific propositions of the hard core.
These propositions can be identified as the decompositional and specifi
cational instructions mentioned earlier in this chapter.
Over time, all the theories appertaining to a program will retain
all the propositions of the hard core, but any additional propositions
will vary from theory to theory.
protective belt of the program.

These extra propositions form the
Another essential ingredient of a pro

gram is the positive heuristic which gives the theoretician his method
ological instructions.

Allegiance to the positive heuristic of the
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program, together with the negative heuristic itself, seem to make up
the Lakatosian equivalent of the Kuhnian paradigm.
The program will progress if the modifications incorporated in the
protective belt lead to new testable hypotheses and then if this addi
tional content is corroborated.

Whenever a theory is not corroborated,

scientists are likely to resort to changes in the protective belt and
modifications which fail the empirical test will indicate to the method
ologist that the program is degenerating.
One benefit of the Lakatosian over the Kuhnian method is that the
SRP approach calls for the condensation of a school of thought to a set
or sets of propositions.

This has the advantage of requiring the

theorist to describe theories very rigorously and accurately.

Yet the

only such application of the Lakatosian methodology to economics was
made by L a t s i s , w h o developed a schema for the neoclassical research
program.

In the eyes of Latsis, the fundamental aspect of neoclassical

theory is its situational determinism, a subject which broaches the
psychological dimension of economic theory.

Economic Psychology
Neoclassical economics is often criticized for overemphasizing the
individual economic agent at the expense of his context— the society
around him.

This is the starting point of a number of critiques of the

neoclassical method.

The general equilibrium system is seen to con

sist of many utility-maximizing individuals reposing in a universal
general equilibrium, in a system which completely ignores the social
environment, the institutional framework and historical background.
Now the accusation of individualism is superficially similar to the
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accusation that neoclassical theory is overly psychological.

In other

words, if economic theory is so intent on analyzing the individual as
to ignore the environmental noise, then it is bound to emphasize the
individual's cognitive processes, hence laying itself upon the accusa
tion of being too psychological.

It may come as a surprise, therefore,

that some writers in this area have found the psychological content of
neoclassical theory to be quite trivial.

The level of psychological

intricacy in the typical neoclassical problem has been compared to the
following:
Predict the behavior of a driver whose automobile is traveling
on a dry road at a speed of 60 m.p.h. at a distance of 10 feet
behind another car, when the latter stops abruptly.
One safe prediction would be that the driver will slam on his brakes
as hard and as quickly as he can.

One could devise very elaborate

psychological explanations of this prediction, but the prediction it
self is not only safe but is also neutral with respect to the various
psychological theories which could be brought to bear upon the problem.
More formally, we can classify the problem as one in which the logic of
the situation tolerates a unique solution, making a psychological study
of the matter redundant.

If the prediction failed to acquire corrobora

tion, the predictor is likely to protest that significant data, such as
suicidal tendencies on the part of the driver, have been held back.
Latsis finds the same to be true in the neoclassical research
program in economics.

Take for example the perfectly competitive model,

where the seller is faced with a horizontal demand tangent to the longrun average cost curve at its lowest point.

In this situation, the

seller has no choice but to produce the quantity corresponding to the
tangency.

It is not just a matter of optimization; it is really a
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question of survival.

The market pushes the price level to a tangency

with the average cost curve and the firm will go out of business unless
its production takes place at the quantity corresponding to the
tangency.

Like the driver in the previous paragraph, the perfect com

petitor really has no choice.

Latsis argues that in economics, prob

lems are set up in such a way that the situation has only a single exit.
Latsis emphasizes the link between the character of such solutions to
the quality of psychological or socio-psychological content; yet one
could equally emphasize the lack of a sociological or political content,
which like the absence of a non-trivial psychological dimension, leads
to the situational determinism.
To elaborate on the psychological aspects of this theme, I shall
introduce Simon’s distinction between substantive and procedural
rationality,"^ a distinction which shall be needed again in our dis
cussion of the rational expectations hypothesis in Chapter 4.

Substan

tive rationality "depends upon the actor in only one respect— his goals.
Given these goals, rational behavior is determined entirely by the
characteristics of the environment in which it takes place."

In the

example of the driver, above, or the firm in the perfectly competitive
model, the problem is set up in such a way that, given a goal— survival—
the behavior of the actor is readily predictable, since the logic of the
situation tolerates only one outcome.

Rationality enters only in the

determination of the goals, but has nothing to do with the procedure of
achieving the goal.

The situational assumptions determine uniquely the

course of action which will lead the agent to that goal.

Psychologists,

however, usually have something different in mind when they deal with
rationality, namely the procedural form of rationality.

On procedural
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rationality, Simon writes:
The process of rational calculation is only interesting when
it is non-trivial— that is, when the substantively rational
response to a situation is not instantly obvious. If you put
a quarter and a dime before a subject and tell him that he
may have either one, but not both, it is easy to predict
which he will choose, but not easy to learn anything about
his cognitive processes. Hence procedural rationality is
usually studied in problem situations— situations in which
the subject must gather information of various kinds and
process it in different ways in order to arrive at a reason
able course of action, a solution to the problem.12
Hence, "behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of
appropriate deliberation.11 When a trade union is about to negotiate a
wage contract, it faces the task of devising a procedure for figuring
out what the rate of inflation is likely to be over the duration of the
contract.

Such problems in procedural rationality are much harder to

handle than those dealing with substantive rationality, where, for ex
ample, the theorist assumes that the rate

of inflation expectedby the

trade union is the same as that predicted

by the model.

More onthis

particular example in Chapter 4.
The distinction between the two forms of rationality is perhaps
clarified by this quotation from Simon's explanation of an experiment
by Feldman^
Suppose that you present a subject with a random sequence of
X's and 0/s, of which 70% are X 5s and 30% O's. You ask the
subject to predict the next symbol, rewarding him for the
number of correct predictions. "Obviously" the rational
behavior is always to predict X. This is what subjects
almost never do. Instead, they act as though the sequence
were patterned, not random, and guess by trying to extra
polate the pattern. This kind of guessing will lead X to
be guessed in proportion to the frequency with which it
occurs in the sequence. As a result, the sequence of guesses
has about the same statistical properties as the original
sequence, but the prediction accuracy is lower than if X had
been predicted each time (58% instead of 70%) .
In this case the study (typical of microeconomics) of what the subjects
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rarely if ever do assumes substantive rationality, while an analysis of
how the subjects attempt to outguess the pattern of X ’s and 0/s is a
study in procedural rationality.
Simon’s distinction between the various forms of rationality is
not the first in the social sciences.

Earlier, Weber distinguished be

tween formal and substantive rationality.

The extent of quantitative

calculation, and the degree to which such calculation is then acted upon
in the pursuit of, say, profit maximization, reflects the formal ration
ality of economic action.

Monetization of the economy is necessary for

formal rationality, which becomes manifested in accounting and budgetary
management techniques.

In contrast, substantive rationality is mani

fested in the "extent to which it is possible to secure what, according
to a given system of values, is an adequate provision of a population
with goods and services, and in the process remain in accord with the
ethical requirements of the system of n o r m s . I n

Weber's words, "it

is not sufficient to consider only the purely formal fact that calcula
tions are being made on grounds of expediency by the methods which are,
among those available, technically the most nearly adequate.

In addi

tion, it is necessary to take account of the fact that economic activity
is oriented to ultimate ends of some kind, whether they be ethical,
political, utilitarian. . . .

Weber's distinction between forms of

rationality manifested by the economy leads to the study of the poten
tial for conflict between them.

Unlike Weber's, Simon's distinction is

between forms of rationality manifested at the same level of the
economy (primarily microeconomic), and there is no hint of any hierarchy
of types of rationality.

The conflict in Simon's case is mostly in the

mind of the methodologist and the theorist:

should the latter set up

sr
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the model in a manner which endows impulsive action with its own form
of rationality (since impulsive action will generate the right result,
if constrained by the proper kind of situational logic), or should the
theorist abstain from modeling this substantive form of rationality,
and deal instead with problems where impulsive action becomes procedurally irrational?

Latsis1 SRP
In the neoclassical model, the economy is sterilized not only of
all extra-economic, social detail but also of most psychological
intricacy.

The absence of these qualities is borne out in Latsis’ sug

gested neoclassical research program.
neoclassical SRP (page
prising the hard core

1 fi

Latsis, in his formulation of a

9), suggests the following propositions as com:

(i)

Decision-makers have correct knowledge of the relevant
features of their economic situation.
(ii) Decision-makers prefer the best available alternative
given their knowledge of the situation and of the
means at their disposal.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), situations generate their internal
’logic' and decision-makers act appropriately to the
logic of their situation.
(iv) Economic units and structures display stable, coordi
nated behavior.
His version of the positive heuristic is as follows:
(a)
(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)

(f)
'

Construct static models.
Minimize and if possible completely eliminate psycho
logical and, in general, non-economic content from the
model.
Set up the situational assumptions in such a way that
a determinate equilibrium issues.
(Set up "Single
exit" situational models.)
Where possible construct functions which are suitable
for the application of the procedures of the calculus.
If the model yields no determinate equilibrium, modify
the situational assumptions until such a solution
becomes possible.
When the model yields a determinate equilibrium, attempt
to refine it by introducing more realistic situational
assumptions.
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The situational determinism of neoclassical theory is particularly evi
dent in hard core proposition (iii) and positive heuristic instructions
(b) and (c).

For example, as applied to indifference curve analysis in

consumer theory, hard core postulate (ii) translates into the assump
tion of utility maximization, while instruction (c) calls for the addi
tion of such assumptions as non-satiation, convexity, and transitivity
of preferences— in effect ensuring a unique solution (a "single exit")
to the utility maximization problem.
One problem inherent in the Lakatosian methodology, is the sweep
of the propositions in the hard-core.

For example, it is conceivable

that a weak version of Keynesian theory would qualify in the neoclassi
cal program, if the latter*s hard-core is watered down sufficiently.
In the practical application of Lakatos1 ideas, the scope of a program
depends crucially on the inclusiveness of the hard-core, which could in
turn be influenced by the vantage-point of the methodologist.

For ex

ample, it could conceivably be argued (though Chapter 4 below reaches
a very different conclusion) that monetarism is part of a wider neo
classical research program, which would itself compete with a Keynesian
program.

This extended neoclassical program would encompass a range of

theories which generally make policy recommendations whose political
flavor is usually labelled as conservative.

However, this revised,

neoclassical hard-core, besides being different from that of Latsis,
would then also be different from what a methodologist would have con
structed, say, 30 years ago, before the emergence of monetarism.
A case will be made in Chapter 3 for a separate, competing Keynes
ian program, as opposed to a mere Keynesian theory within the larger
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neoclassical program— the justification being that Keynesian policy
recommendations often vary widely from those of a neoclassicist.

The

positive heuristic of the Keynesian program directs the theorist to
construct macroeconomic models, and as shall be argued in Chapter 3,
this has a lot to do with the types of policy recommendations which
emerge.

This suggests the proposition (d) in Latsis’ neoclassical

positive heuristic above ought perhaps to be reworded to specify the
microeconomic character of the static models.

As it stands, the term

"decision-makers" in the hard-core could possibly refer to macroeconom
ic policy makers, and this possibility must be excluded.
While an improvement over Kuhn's in that it allows for the coex
istence of rival, powerful programs, Lakatos' framework shares with
Kuhn's a suggesv;ion of the social setting of science.

The influence of

the intellectual environment on the individual scientist is manifested,
in particular, in Lakatos' negative heuristic.

This context-dependency

of economic thought is further explored in the next section.

The Role of Econometrics
Some methodologists believe that change in economic theory is the
result of hard thinking by academicians and ruthless testing by econo
metricians.

In contrast to this objectivist attitude, relativists view

the social environment of economists as the major determinant of econom
ic thought. ^
positions.

The true picture probably lies somewhere between the two

For one thing, crucial testing often comes from, and there

fore varies with contemporary events and developments in society and in
these situations there is an element of truth in both points of view.
For example, the early Keynesian models, which ignored the price level
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and the rate of inflation, were widely acceptable in the inflation-free
50's, but were less and less satisfactory as inflation accelerated in
later decades.

The objectivist would hold that Keynesian theory failed

to explain the course of price movements and was therefore refuted.
The relativist would counter that such a refutation, aside from its
correctness or otherwise, is itself a function of the times and their
problems:

were not inflation such a problem in the '70's, this refuta

tion would never have come about and Keynesianism would now be more
widely adhered to.

There seems to be a social process of evidence-

selection, where only certain aspects of the total evidence are investi
gated.

(To take another example, unemployment constituted a social and

economic problem well before Keynesian times, but it was not fully
recognized as such.-'-®)

What is being suggested is that in the same

manner as the theorist selects out certain variables and certain rela
tionships for his detailed study, so also the econometrician is likely
to analyze not the entire span of human of history, but merely a short
part thereof.

To come back to the question of inflation in Keynesian

theory, one should mention that some objectivists may appropriately add
that the inflation of the '70's is itself the result of the earlier,
misguided policies suggested by Keynesian theory, and that these recom
mendations simply failed the test of the '70's.
Here lies another crucial characteristic of the social sciences.
The experiment of the natural scientist usually leaves the subject
matter unchanged, but the theorizing of social scientists, especially
when buttressed by the evidence, may lead to policy changes, which in
turn— through their effect on economic or other variables— will influ
ence the nature of the evidence as received by future social scientists.
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Clearly, econometricians who respect their own profession would
adhere to the objectivist position, which is in turn part of the wider
positivist view.

For a positivist, econometrics play an important role

in the search for regularities in the data, and in projecting these
regularities into the future.

Degeneration or progression of the SRP

depends crucially, by this view, on the econometric results.

(Others,

/

however, are dubious of the ability of econometrics to discriminate
between good and bad theories and they point to the endless debates in
the literature.)
The positivist approach seeks to expand the predictive capabili
ties of economics:

true science enables us to predict future experi-

ence, and so control our environment. 1Q
3

The positivist procedure is to

set up models whose predictions are then tested.

The "problem of

induction" recognizes that it is impossible for a test or any number of
tests to verify a universal statement, or even of negating it.

Just

because the sun has so far risen every morning, it does not follow that
the universal statement, "the sun rises every morning" or "the earth
turns every day," is true.

Also, the negation of a universal statement

by some crucial experiment can be circumscribed quite easily.

For ex

ample, the typical test involves not one hypothesis in isolation, but
rather a whole set of hypotheses.

If the results are negative, the

whole set is refuted, but this does not necessarily mean that each
hypothesis is false.

So, if I test the statement, "Quantity demanded

depends upon the price, all other things being equal," and the test
proves negative, I can, if I so choose, maintain that quantity demanded
does indeed depend upon the price, but that during the test, one or
more of the "other things" changed.

The crucial experiment, the one
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which makes or breaks the theory, so to speak, is very rare and so the
tester can usually only collect evidence for, or against a hypothesis,
in other words, resort to probabilistic corroboration.

"To say that an

observation increases the probability of a hypothesis . . .

is equiva

lent to saying that the observation increases the degree of confidence
with which it is rational to entertain the hypothesis."
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This approach, with all its limitations, is common to all the
sciences, whether natural or social.

The best that can be achieved in

any science is not absolute verification, but merely probabilistic cor
roboration:

the econometrician, for example, never seeks to prove a

hypothesis, but merely to gather further supporting observations,
enhancing the probability that a hypothesis is correct.

It. is in the

very nature of this method that the interpretation of the statistical
results is somewhat subjective, partly because no test is powerful
enough to yield clear and overriding results.

To take the simplest of

examples, a comparison of the correlation coefficients for two separate,
single equation models (with the same dependent variable) is valid only
when they have a common number of independent variables.

Even if this

condition is met, other test statistics (such as the t-statistics cor
responding to the parameter estimates) need to be consulted, and there
is no assurance that different statistics will yield converging results.
The problems of interpretation become more intricate as the number of
equations increases.
These difficulties are compounded by the peculiarities of the social
sciences.

Some economists scoff at the differences between the natural

and the social sciences and point out that astronomers too cannot con
duct experiments with the planets and the stars, and that therefore
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there is nothing intrinsically different between the non-laboratory
method of economics and the method of the natural sciences.

This

observation depends crucially on the interpretation of the word
"intrinsically."

Natural scientists generally conduct their experi

ments under conditions which allow them to maintain total control over
which variables participate— human genetics and astronomy being major
exceptions.

The typical problems of econometrics— omission of a rele

vant variable from an equation, the inclusion of an irrelevant variable,
serial correlation, simultaneity bias, heteroscedacticity, and all the
complications manifested in the behavior of the error term— are of
little concern to the natural sciences, where the experimental method
and the process of Fisherian randomization ensure that the error term
is harmless. 22
The problems discussed in econometric theory deal with instances
where the assumptions underlying the classical linear regression model
(CLR) are not satisfied.

With all the assumptions met, the ordinary

least squares method would yield parameter estimates from which infor
mation about population parameters can readily be inferred.

If, for

example, the relationship between the variables under study is not
linear, a crucial CLR assumption is breached.

The problem of non-

linearity is obviously not unique to econometrics or any other nonexperimental science.

(Of course, in the non-experimental sciences

there is a greater likelihood— because of the difficulties inherent in
the testing procedures— that the scientist will be compelled to extra
polate his results, valid as they may be for small ranges where linear
ity is a reasonable approximation, to a longer span where non-lineari
ties come into play.)

But the majority of the problems are due entirely
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to the non-experimental nature of econometrics.

Take the problem of

multicollinearity— the breach of the CLR condition that no pair of inde
pendent variables be linearly related.

If the economist could construct

his own experiments and rigidly control the variables, the problem of
multicollinearity would more easily be controlled. As important are the
problems relating to the error term— the non-zero mean of the distur
bance term, heteroscedacticity

(or non-constant variance of the error

term), autocorrelated error term and so on.

It is only when research is

carried on outside the laboratory that the error term becomes very
troublesome and such problems assume significant proportions.
Another problem which has nothing to do with the breach of any
CLR assumptions, but still reflects the difficulties of the. non-experi
mental method is that of deriving parameter estimates for the original
equations in a simultaneous system after the reduced forms are put to
the test, namely the problem of identification.

Complete control over

the variables, as in the experimental sciences, excludes the overlap
between endogenous and independent variables:

in an experimental test,

independent variables are more strictly controlled by the scientist.
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The presumption that the methods of the natural sciences carry over
well to the social sciences can perhaps be challenged from a different
angle, which has to do with the multi-level nature of causality in
social systems.

Suppose one were to attempt a mathematical representa

tion of a situation where the rate of inflation is perceived as being
positively related to trade union pressure on wages, accommodated by an
expansive monetary policy.

The permissiveness of monetary policy is a

condition necessary in the model for trade union pressure to be trans
mitted into higher prices.

A regression one could test in an attempt
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at empirical corroboration would be:

P = aQ + a1 T + a2 M,

where T is a proxy for trade union strength, M stands for monetary
growth, P for the rate of inflation.
derivative,
changing M,

Then a^ is equal to the partial

3 P , which measures the influence of T on P, with an un3 T
Now suppose the model accurately represents reality, that

is that trade unions do indeed cause inflation, but only if the mone
tary authorities allow them to.

In that case, the partial derivative

of P with respect to T will equal zero:

without a monetary change,

trade union cannot influence the rate of inflation.

But such a result

in no way justifies the statement that "trade union power has no effect
on inflation."

On the contrary, trade unions serve as a conduit for

monetary pressures on the rate of inflation.

The trouble is the con

tribution of trade unions is different from that of the monetary
authorities:

the two influences do not operate at the same level.

We

have a hierarchy of influences, while econometrics appears to capture
a relationship at only one level of the hierarchy.^
The intrinsic limitations of econometric tools reinforces the
importance of the a_ priori.

A pertinent episode is recounted by H.O.

Wold,25 who notes that in the experimental sciences, the estimation of
a^ and b^ in

y - aL + b xz

and the estimation of a„ and b
2

z = a

+ b y
2

2

2

in
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is such that

The problem of the "choice or regression" does not arise in the experi
mental sciences, since the researcher can easily keep track of which
one was the independent variable, and can therefore compute the para
meter estimates accordingly.

With the non-experimental method, however,

the two regression relationships become

E(yjz) = a ’^ + b *^z

and

E(z|y) = a'2 + b' y

The presence of an error term in the computation implies that

b'

)SJL
2

b ’x

and

a' )i

a 'l
-

2

b'x

In 1906, P. Mackeprang attempted to estimate the price elasticity of
coffee and could not make up his mind between the two alternative esti
mates, 0.42 and 0.83, and presented the problem as involving a "choice
of regression."

Nowadays, most economists would choose the first esti

mate, obtained by regressing quantity on price.

That such a choice

would be made regardless of what the summary statistics indicate re
flects the importance of the a_ priori and the weakness of econometric
tools.
A combination of some of the problems alluded to above appears to
be at work in the ongoing debate about the St. Louis equations.

The

25
original tests published in 1968 by Andersen and Jordan^ assessed the
relative strength of monetary and fiscal policy (the former as measured
by the narrowly defined money stock, the latter by high employment
federal expenditures) and found the former to be more effective.
reply in 1969, by De Leeuw and Kalchbrenner,9

7

A

disputed these findings

on the grounds that the independent variables were not truly exogenous,
a condition necessary for the absence of correlation between the independent variables and the error term.

Benjamin Friedman
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retested the

equations with data through 1976 and found fiscal policy to be more
effective:

the St. Louis equation now believed in fiscal policy.

Carlson^ rejected Friedman's results:

he found that: heteroscedacticity

plagued the Friedman data, but not the original Andersen-Jordan data.
To guarantee homoscedacticity Carlson reestimated the Friedman equation:
whereas Friedman (like Andersen-Jordan) used the first differences of
all the variables, Carlson substituted rates-of-change.

Vrooman 10 com

plained that this switch in specification destroys the comparability of
the results with the original Andersen-Jordan, and also suggested that
the observed heteroscedacticity reflects more than a statistical prob
lem:

the St. Louis equation might have been suffering from misspecifi-

cation all along.

Difficulty in resolving these issues seems to stem

primarily from the non-experimental nature of econometrics manifested
in a troublesome error term, and possibly also from the failure of
single-level equation systems to handle structural shifts through time.
In closing, mention ought to be made of another possible source of
weakness in econometric testing:

the quality of the statistical data.

It could be argued that the collection of data is itself subject to
theoretical considerations.

It is itself paradigmatic, or (in
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Lakatosian terms) it belongs within a scientific research program and
is therefore performed according to the rules of some positive heuris
tic.

If this program is a larger one which also includes economic

theory, there might be an automatic bias testing of such theory as well
as theories in competing programs.

This application of Lakatos' SRP to

statistical data collection is not discussed in the literature, but
there are many indications that it could be a fruitful line of research.
A sampling of areas of potential problems would include:

Von Mises^l

categorically states that the insolubility of the index number problem
implies the nonsensical nature of- the concept of the absolute price
level; present-day adherents to the Austrian school accordingly reject
the social accounting systems of

m a c ro e c o n o m ic s .

^2

Baumgartner and

DeVille^ raise serious questions about the disparity in the treatment
in national income accounting between labor and capital.

Harris-^

questions the usefulness of published macroeconomic data to Marxist
analysis.

Though it does not necessarily follow that this issue is

relevant to the statistical analysis of the monetarist-Keynesian debate,
it is deserving of further consideration.

Conclusion
Empirical testing is surely a healthy exercise which stimulates
and enhances the development of economic theory.
limitations.

Yet it does have some

And it is these limitations which lead to the predicament

of some major economic debates.

Wilber traces the development of the

controversy surrounding the Friedman-Meiselman findings, in a manner
similar to the discussion of the St. Louis equation above.

He adds,

"when the theory becomes so immune to refutation, it functions more as
a prescriptive than a descriptive device.

This is the way

the Keynesian-
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monetarist controversy should be seen."-^

According to the positivist

methodology, of course, prescriptions, or normative statements, do not
belong in scientific practice.

With these thoughts in mind, the follow

ing chapters concentrate on the &_ priori in microeconomic and macroeconomic monetary theory.

28

Chapter Notes

% . A. Simon, The sciences of the artificial, Cambridge:
1969.

MIT Press,

2m . Friedman, A theoretical framework for monetary analysis, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971, pp. 31-34.
% . Friedman, "The methodology of positive economics," in Essays in
positive economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
^T. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edition, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970.
^K. R. Popper, Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific
knowledge, New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
^T. S. Kuhn, The essential tension, Chicago:
Press, 1977.

University of Chicago

^This view is expressed by P. K. Feyerabend in "Consolation for the
specialist" in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Eds., Criticism and the
growth of knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
^Applications of Kuhn’s ideas to economics include D. F. Gordon, "The
role of the history of economic thought in the understanding of
modern economic theory," The American Economic Review, 1965, 55,
pp. 119-127; A. W. Coats, "Is there a 'structure of scientific
revolutions' in economics?," Kyklos, 1969, 22, pp. 289-296; R. D. C.
Black, A. W. Coats and C. D. W. Goodwin, The marginal revolution in
economics, interpretation and evaluation, Durham, N .C .: Duke
University Press, 1973; B. Ward, What's wrong with economics?, New
York: Basic Books, 1972; J. Baumberger, "No Kuhnian revolutions in
economics" in Journal of Economic Issues, March 1977, 11, No. 1, pp.
1-20; D. Winch, Economics and policy, a historical study, New York:
Walker, 1969, pp. 174-176.
^1. Lakatos, "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research
programmes" in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Eds., Criticism and the
growth of knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970,
pp. 91-195; "History of science and its rational reconstructions"
in C. Howson, Ed., Method and appraisal in the physical sciences:
the critical background to modern science, 1800-1905, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 1-39.
•^S. J. Latsis, "A research program in economics," in S. J. Latsis, Ed.,
Method and appraisal in economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976, pp. 1-41.

29

H-H. A. Simon, "From substantive to procedural rationality" in S. J.
Latsis, Ed., op. cit.
1%.

A. Simon, ibid.

1% .

A. Simon, o£. cit.; J. Feldman,"Simulation of behavior inthe
binary choice experiment" in E. A. Feigenbaum and J. Feldman, Eds.,
Computers and thought, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1963.

l^T.

Parsons, introductionto M. Weber, The theory of social and Economic
organization, New York: Free Press, 1947, p. 35.

1% . Weber,

0 £.

cit., p. 185.

16s. J. Latsis, ibid., p. 22.
■*-^For a strong contrast between these positions, compare M. Blaug,
Economic theory in retrospect (3rd edition), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978 with L. Rogin, The meaning and validity of
economic theory, New York: Harper, 1956.
l®See D. Winch, ibid., p. 167.
■^A. J. Ayer, Language, truth and logic, New York:
1952, p. 50.
90

Dover Publications,

A. J. Ayer, op. cit., p. 101.

^lln Lakatosian terminology, the failure to generate testable hypotheses
and gather supporting observations leads to the degeneration of the
scientific research program.
If one wants to replace the logical empiricism with a Popperian
flavor, then the econometrician is said to actively seek to refute,
probabilistically, his hypothesis.
99

^H . A. Wold, "Econometrics as pioneering in non-experimental model
building," Econometrica, July 1969, _37^ No. 3, pp. 369-381; T.
Haavelmo, "The role of the econometrician in the advancement of
economic theory," Econometrica, July 1958, 26, No. 3, pp. 351-357;
H. Wold, "Causality and econometrics," Econometrica, 1954, 22, pp.
162-177.
In an ambivalent statement, which does not quite resolve this
issue, Friedman argues, "evidence cast up by experience is abundant
and frequently as conclusive as that from contrived experiments;
thus the inability to conduct experiments is not a fundamental ob
stacle to testing hypotheses by the success of their predictions.
But such evidence is far more difficult to interpret. It is frequ
ently complex and always indirect and incomplete. . . . The denial
to economics of the dramatic and direct evidence of the 'crucial'

30

experiment does not hinder the adequate testing of hypotheses; but
this is much less significant than the difficulties it places in
the way of achieving a reasonably prompt and wide consensus on the
conclusions justified by the available evidence." (M. Friedman,
"The methodology of positive economics," ££. cit.)
^Perhaps the most striking, recent example of the identification prob
lem has to do with the Solow-Tobin test of the natural rate of
unemployment. They estimated the equation
ut = fl<Pt “ tP*-l) + P2tPt-l + ^ i ut-i + L
i

t1)

where Ut stands for the unemployment rate in period t, pt is the
rate of inflation at period t, and tP*-l ■'•s t^ie rate °f inflation
expected in period t-1, looking forward one period, that is to
period t, and where

tP?-l = £ viPt-i

(2)

From (1) and (2), it follows that

ut = PlPt + <P2 " Pl)IviPt-l
+ IMt-1
+ £ <3)
l
i
Unfortunately, no test of (3) can ever generate an estimate of j^2,
and without such an estimate no light can be shed on the natural
rate hypothesis.
In other words, that parameter is unidentifiable
from the estimates of equation (3). A way out is to assume that
the sum of weights v^ is 1.
But that presumes away the rational
expectations hypothesis. This is an ugly dilemma for those pro
ponents of the natural rate hypothesis who are also adherents to
the rational expectations hypothesis.
(See Thomas J. Sargent,
"Testing for neutrality and rationality," in Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis, A prescription for monetary policy: proceedings
from a seminar series, 1976.)
^ I n dealing with this matter, Kennedy feels that this problem is quite
easily resolved.
It could be that
is itself determined by variables
outside the model. For example, the extent to which
a firm reacts to demand changes may depend on govern
ment policy parameters such as tax rates.This prob
lem is most easily resolved by substituting
the
relationship determining ^ directly into the original
estimating function. Thus if we have for example,

y = p i + p 2x 2 + e
and

^ 2, say, is determined as

^2

“

^1

+

^

2Z2

w e c a n c o m b i n e t hese r e l a t i o n s h i p s

y =

to get

+c*ixi +0f2(x2z2) + £

so that e s t i m a t i o n shou l d b e u n d e r t a k e n b y i n c l u d i n g
the n e w v a r i a b l e (X 2 Z 2 ) as an a d d i t i o n a l regressor.
(P. Kennedy, A g u i d e to e c onometrics, Cambridge:
M I T Press, 197975
A s i d e from the q u e s t i o n a s to w h e t h e r o n e is p r e p a r e d to l i n e a r i z e
the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of j$2 , t here is a f u r t h e r p r o b l e m w i t h K e n n e d y ' s
suggestion.
S u p p o s e o ne w i s h e s to test the h y p o t h e s i s that m o n e 
tary p o l i c y (z) i n f l u e n c e s n o m i n a l inco m e (y) v ia two t r a n s m i s s i o n
channels.
One o p e r a t e s d i r e c t l y o n y, the o t h e r o p e r a t e s Indire c t l y
through fiscal p o l i c y ( x ) . Th i s m e a n s that n o t o n l y d o e s m o n e t a r y
p o l i c y d i r e c t l y s t i m u l a t e inco m e (through, say, the r e a l b a l a n c e
effect), b u t also t h r o u g h its a c c o m m o d a t i o n of f i scal policy.
Let
the a rrows r e p r e s e n t d i r e c t i o n of influence; then

y

X
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suggestion, and end up w i t h

throughout, w e f o l l o w K e n n e d y ' s

y = aQ + a ^ x + a 2 z

a l = ^0

^iz

T h e r efore y = aQ + b g x + b-^zx + a 2 Z
N o w let us set up,
tive system:
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(1)
the following alterna

y

* 4 “
z
w h i c h is a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n of the model:
it suggests
that fiscal p o l i c y a f f e c t s income d i r e c t l y as w e l l as indirectly,
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Then,
y = S q + a ^ z + a 2x
a l = ^0 + ^ix
and therefore y = 3q + b Q Z + b j x z + a 2 X

(2)
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Equation (2) is not identifiable from equation (1). This seems to
be a problem which often follows when multi-level systems are
collapsed into single-level systems.
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CHAPTER 2

A NEOCLASSICAL MONETARY MODEL

The previous chapter introducted Lakatos' scientific research pro
gram (SRP), and its application to economics by Latsis.

The latter

dealt mainly with the theory of the firm in various market structures—
theories which form part of the larger neoclassical SRP.

Other areas of

neoclassical theory which could be presented in a similar format would
include consumer and growth theory, as well as monetary theory.

In each,

the distinguishing criterion— the characteristic which separates them
from theories belonging to competing programs— is the microeconomic
situational determinism (page 10) built into the models.

This determin

ism in turn is predicated on the presumption of the substantive form of
rationality.

This is particularly relevant for the purposes of this

dissertation because this determinism is shared by the rational expecta
tions hypothesis, a subject of discussion in Chapter 4.
This chapter looks at neoclassical, microeconomic, monetary theory
in some detail, in preparation for the discussion of Keynesian and mone
tarist theory in later chapters.

It will suggest a qualification to the

assertion that neoclassical monetary theory is situationally determinate
in all its aspects.

The Neoclassical Dichotomy
The term "transmission mechanism" refers to the manner in which
monetary changes, originating in policy or otherwise, affect economic
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variables.

The centerpiece of neoclassical monetary theory is the so-

called neutral nature of money.

Neutrality means that any effect of

monetary changes on variables other than the absolute price level is
temporary, to be reversed in a long run where all quantities and rela
tive prices return to their starting position.

This chapter will address

itself to those transmission channels whose influence is restricted to
the absolute price level.
Despite the agreement among such neoclassical models on long-run
neutrality, there has been substantial controversy as to the nature and
specific formulation of a model which, while satisfying all the neo
classical criteria, will not, at the same time, suffer from logical flaws.
Logical elegance and consistency are among the hallmarks of.the neoclassical method;
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hence, the search for logical contradictions in any

model which claims to be neoclassical.
All neoclassical models separate the determination of real variables
from that of nominal values.

In some simplified models this is achieved

by having a set of equations determine the real variables, namely the
level of output and relative prices.

One additional equation introduces

the money supply and sets the absolute price level.

The "real" set is

self-contained and has as many equations as unknown variables.
dichotomy of monetary from value theory is complete.3

The

Consider one such

macroeconomic model:
s
s
i
q
L
W/P

=
=
=
=
=
=

i
s(r)
i(r)
q(L)
L(W/P)
qL (L)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

In this model, six equations determine six unknowns:
two components, s (saving)

q (output) and its

and i (investment); two relative prices, r
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(the interest rate) and W/P (the real wage); and L (the labor force).
The addition of a further equation— the quantity equation—
M = q PK

(7)

determines a further unknown, P (the absolute price level); M is the
money stock and K is a constant.
This model, although aggregative, has traditional, neoclassicalleanings.

Although it borrows from the Keynesian method in the use of

such aggregate concepts as saving

and investment, several features dis

tinguish it from the typical Keynesian models.

For example, the labor

market (equations (5) and (6)) take the economy to full employment, and
this level of employment is then related to the full-employment level of
output (equation (4)).

The equality of aggregate demand and aggregate

supply therefore occurs automatically at full employment.
A closer look reveals a possible problem in the model.
introduce Walras’ and Say’s Laws.

We first

The former states that any system of

markets taken as a whole will have a net excess demand equivalent to
zero.

Excess demand in one or more markets must necessarily have a

counterpart excess supply
demand of zero.

in one or more other markets, for a net excess

The logic behind this is that the offer, or supply, of

goods on a market is only one facet of a market transaction or an attempt
at a market transaction; other goods, or more likely money, are expected
and demanded in return.

The implication is that Walras’ Law is an iden

tity and will hold at all times, both in and out of equilibrium.
But is the same true of the markets for commodities taken on their
own, in other words the markets for all goods and services except money?
9?y's Law answers this question in the positive:

there can be no net

excess demand in all commodity markets taken together.

Let us consider
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the identity version of Say’s Law and examine the only two possible
eventualities:

Say’s Identity is either true or untrue.

Suppose first that Say’s Identity is true, and let us analyze the
consequences for a monetized economy.

This identity implies that excess

demand for the real sector as a whole is identically (that is, irrespec
tive of whether the real sector is in equilibrium or not) equal to zero.
Invoking Walras’ Law, we can adduce that there can be no excess demand,
or disequilibrium, in the money market.
are identically equal.

Money supply and money demand

If the equality in (7) above were

replaced by

an identity sign (=), P would be rigidly defined as M/qK, whereas an
equation would have told us about the behavior of P when in equilibrium,
and would have then set us on the separate task of finding P ’s behavior
out of equilibrium.

A definition cannot indicate any causality.

As a

result, P could change and since q is exogenous for the purposes of the
equation, M would simultaneously follow suit and change by the same pro
portion.

In that sense, P is indeterminate.

This unsatisfactory state

of affairs can be corrected by reneging on Say’s Identity.
Therefore suppose that Say's Identity is not true.

Then, a situa

tion might occur where the real sector is in disequilibrium and, in view
of the dichotomy (the complete separation of money from real markets),
the money market will search independently for its own equilibrium.

In

this situation, it is entirely possible that the commodity markets be
in disequilibrium while the money market reaches a state of equilibrium.
The dichotomy removes all assurance that Walras' Law— that the sum of
excess demands in all markets be equal to zero— would hold.

The discon

nection of the monetary sector from the rest of the economy removes the
mechanism which would have insured the validity of Walras' Law.

This
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is an equally undesirable situation.
The only way out of this bind is to breach the dichotomy, and
include money in the real sector.
money inside the utility functions.

This can be achieved by including
(These functions would be included

in the general equilibrium model which underlies the aggregative model.)
Then we would reject Say’s Identity, and include money in the real
sector.
kets

The interrelationship between the money and the commodity mar

would ensure that, when the commodity market is in disequilibrium,

so is the money market.

Net excess demand in either one will be accom

panied by net excess supply in the other, for a total, economy-wide net
excess demand of zero, thus ensuring compliance with Walras’ Law.
We can refer to the absolute price level as the relative price of
nominal money.

In an aggregative model, with one composite commodity,^

the relative price of nominal money stands for the amount of the compo
site commodity that will exchange for one unit of nominal money.

(In a

more decomposed, microeconomic model, the absolute price level is re
placed by the set of relative prices of nominal money for each of the
various commodities.)

An increase in the supply of nominal money can be

expected to have repercussions on this relative price.

There can be no

monetary effect on the rest of the economy (i.e., there can be no mone
tary transmission mechanism) unless the model integrates the monetary
and commodity sectors.

A dichotomy of the two would make the demand for

commodities functionally independent of the holdings of money; this
would leave the rate of exchange of money for commodities totally inde
terminate.

Foregoing the dichotomy permits monetary changes to affect

the markets for commodities; it is only by virtue of this effect that
monetary changes can influence the absolute price level.
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The real balance effect, made possible by the inclusion of M inside
the utility function, constitutes the transmission channel in neoclassi
cal theory.

The Real Balance Effect^
Inclusion of money in the utility function implies that the utility
maximizer will allocate his resources between additions to his money
stock and the purchase of commodities.

The utility maximizer will begin

the exchange period with initial endowments of commodities and money.
In figure 1, real balances are represented on the vertical axis, real in
come on the horizontal axis.

If real income or output at the beginning

of the period were OA and real balances AF, the budget line would be CD,
which has a slope of 135°.

Although the budget line reaches point C on

the horizontal axis, real output cannot exceed OA, which represents in
come at full employment.

An individual can always exchange output for

real balances, but the representative individual cannot obtain output
in excess of OA.
Take initial point F, the intersection of AZ (the perpendicular at
real income A) with the budget line CD.
OE.

Let F be off the expansion path

In such an event, the utility maximizer will reduce his real bal

ances by FH— the vertical distance between F and R— in order to consume
OG in commodities.

As a result, real balances will shrink to AH by the

start of the "next" period, and when the "next" period comes around the
utility maximizer will move along his new budget line to J, which lies
on the expansion path.
period.

Again, real balances decline to AK by the next

This process goes on until M is reached.

Here the utility

maximizer is in long-run equilibrium, defined along long-run Hicksian
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lines.

Hicksian full equilibrium occurs "not merely when demands equal

supplies at the currently established prices," that is at such points as
R, H, J, and so on, but "also when the same prices continue to rule at
all dates."

The latter situation, at point M, represents equilibrium

over time, or long-run equilibrium, and will be the only position sanc
tioned by the Walrasian auctioneer.^

From that point onwards, Walrasian

general equilibrium is perpetually maintained, barring some change in
some exogenous variable:
point onwards.

the real money stock does not change from this

Note that changes in the stock of real balances would

imply excess supply or demand for commodities, which cannot be allowed
in long-run equilibrium.
Consider now, in Figure 2, an increase in real balances from an
initial position of equilibrium at M.
NS.

Let real balances grow from NM to

The budget line will shift to QT and the utility maximizer will find

himself at S, the intersection of the new budget line with the perpendi
cular at the unchanging real income level, N.

The same mechanism

described in the previous paragraph will drive the utility maximizer to M.
On the other hand, an increase in real income from ON to OP (in
figure 3) will shift the budget line from QS to RT, with the eventual
new equilibrium moving from M on the old budget line to V on the new.
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that changes along the
vertical axis, which represents real balances, will in no way influence
relative prices or the quantity of the composite commodity represented
on the horizontal axis.

Note also that the ultimate, equilibrium posi

tion along the budget line is defined and completely determined by the
level of real commodity output and the expansion path.

Although

desired money holdings are recognized as being determined by the choice
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criteria of utility maximizers (as described along the expansion path),
the monetary sector could justifiably be called a passive appendage to
the real (commodity) sector.

Production and exchange conditions in the

commodity sector determine the real quantity of the composite commodity
and the relative price structure within that composite commodity.

With

the utility map determining the expansion path, the quantity of real
balances is endogenous and will change in relation to the quantity of
real output, in a relationship defined by the expansion path.

Monetary

policy as we understand the term, is neutral and insignificant.

Any

change in the money supply has no' effect on relative prices, real out
put or total utility.

There is therefore a transmission mechanism, but

its effect is purely on an irrelevant variable, the absolute price
level, which does not enter the utility function.

The only relevant

monetary variable is determined endogenously, not by the money supplier.
These results emerge from the nature of a utility function,which
bears closer examination.

The utility function is homogeneous of degree

zero in the nominal money stock and all prices
U = U(q^» ^2’

^ 1 ’ ^ 2 ’ ’** ^n^

If all the variables to the right of the semi-colon were to double, for
example, total utility would remain unchanged.

As resources are fully

employed and the economy is satiated with real money balances, total
utility is taken to its highest possible level U*.
is assured by the homogeneity postulate:

Monetary satiation

changes in absolute prices

will take real money balances to their desired level, without having
any other repercussions on the economy.

With U as U*, any changes in

M, given the homogeneity postulate will require proportionately equi
valent changes in all prices for equilibrium to be restored.

The
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homogenei-ty postulate is the reason for the neutrality of money.
The statement "money is neutral" means that, following a change
in the money supply, the exchange rate between any pair of commodities
will return to its original position by the time the system returns to
an equilibrium position.

In other words, the relative price of nominal

money in terms of each of the various commodities will change by the
same proportion.

We can restate the above as follows:

■^pi/pi = "2>M/M
and

^(p^/Pj)/3H = 0

for

any i,

for

any i,j,

for

any i,j.

which will hold only if
B ( U i/Uj)/aM = 0

where i,j are commodities, M is money and U is the social utility func
tion. 8

Situational Determinism and the Money Supply
There can be little doubt that this monetary model shares all the
propositions of the hard-core of neoclassical research program repro
duced from Latsis in Chapter 1 and also observes all the instructions in
the positive heuristic of that program.

Proposition (i) dealing with

the adequacy of knowledge and proposition (ii) concerning optimization
are both met in the monetary model.

Situational determinism— the

essence of proposition (iii) of the hard-core, and also required by
instruction (c) of the positive-heuristic— is very evident too:

the

path to long-run equilibrium at the intersection of the real income line
and the expansion path is inevitable and obvious.

The model is static

[positive heuristic(a)], amenable to the calculus [positive heuristic
(d)], and clean of absolutely all non-economic content [positive

heuristic(b)].
The previous paragraph addressed itself to various aspects of mone
tary demand and monetary equilibrium.

It may be fruitful to reevaluate

the neoclassical situational determinism from a different angle:
does it manifest itself with regard to the money supply?

how

To rephrase

this question, how does money compare with an ordinary commodity?

The

supply of the latter in the neoclassical theory of the firm is character
ized by situational determinism.

Can the same be said of the money

stock?
Viewed as a real quantity, money in the neoclassical model is simi
lar, in many respects, to any other good.

For example, an increase in

the money supply from a situation of equilibrium, where all exogenous
variables and parameters remain unchanged, will eventually totally re
verse itself.

An increase in the money stock which represents, say, an

experiment on the part of the central bank will temporarily constitute
an increase in the real stock of money; but since the system was at rest
to start with, and because there was no change in any of the exogenous
variables or parameters, the system will eventually return to the status
quo ante, with the real money stock back at its original level.

There

is here a close parallel with what would happen in a perfectly competi
tive economy where producers of some commodity, although already maxi
mizing their profits, decided as an experiment to produce more of their
product.

The excess supply would depress the price sufficiently for

all of their output to be sold, but the new price would be uneconomic
enough to induce the sellers to cut production back to its original
level; the relative price would follow suit.

Similarly, an increase in

the real money stock will reverse itself, and the only difference
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between the old and the new equilibrium will be in the absolute price
level.
This analogy breaks down, however, on closer investigation.

In

the real world, market forces do not usually penalize the producers of
money for their additional output.

One also notes that, while the pro

ducers of the commodity unilaterally reduced their output after finding
themselves unable to sell their higher level of output at the original
price, the same is not true of money producers; it is not by way of any
act of money producers that the money stock returns to its original
level.
Note also that in the commodity example, neoclassical theory pre
dicts that the new equilibrium price will be identical to that at the
old equilibrium.

So to carry on with the analogy we have to identify

the relative price of real money.

By analogy with the commodity indus

try, we would expect the relative price of real money to return to its
old level at the new equilibrium.

Here we run into conceptual problems.

Real money has by its very definition a fixed rate of exchange.

A

dollar at 1956 prices is always what a dollar would have bought in 1956.
The analogy with the commodity industry collapses once we recognize
that, while the relative price of a commodity will change during dis
equilibrium and finally return to its original level, in the case of
the money industry the relative price of real money cannot be said to
return to its original position, since it cannot, by its very defini
tion, ever deviate from it in the first place.
One can easily argue that these difficulties in applying regular
economic analysis to money arose only because the analysis was framed
in terms of the real money stock.

The actual liabilities of the money
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issue are really— in a legal sense— nominal units, in much the same way
as the physical quantity of commodities is best represented by measure
ment in real terms.

This, of course, coincides with the neoclassical

view that what the authorities have a handle on is the nominal money
stock but that the real money stock is out of their control and is
entirely in the hands of the public.

Let us therefore tackle the same

exercise afresh, this time using the nominal money stock as our unit of
analysis.

Again consider a starting position of equilibrium which is

disturbed by an increase in the money stock.

Neoclassical theory would

predict that the nominal money stock will remain permanently at its
higher level, and so will the absolute price level.

The absolute price

level represents the relationship of the set of the relative prices of
nominal money now to the set at some reference point in time.

This

means that the theory will predict that the relative price of nominal
money will remain permanently at its higher level.
In other words, unlike the commodity industry, the money industry
incorporates no mechanism which would correct a deviation from its
equilibrium position.

If the issuer of money responded to market

stimuli in the fashion of the commodity producer who was discussed
above, then we could start at a position representing equilibrium to
the producer; any deviation from this position not warranted by change
in any of the exogenous variables or parameters would lead to further
changes which would in turn evoke corrective action on the part of the
producer, back to the old equilibrium.^
Instead the nominal money stock cannot be said to be in, or out
of equilibrium:

it is an exogenous variable.

This has implications

for Latsis' views on the situational determinism of neoclassical
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theory.

In neoclassical monetary theory, there certainly is situational

determinism on the demand side for money.

The demand is for real

balances and is treated on a par with the demand for commodities:

it

is subject to the utility-maximizer's choice criteria as manifested in
the utility map.

The model is built in such a way that the "logic of

the situation" requires the utility-maximizer to go to the intersection
of the real output line and the expansion path, in the same manner as
the perfectly competitive firm goes to the lowest point of the average
cost curve.

On the supply side, however, the money stock should be

viewed only in nominal terms and here, situational determinism cannot
be said to apply.
determinate.

Viewed in nominal terms, the money supply is not

The criteria for its determination are indicated.

How could such an important variable as the money supply, the size
of which is nowadays subject to so much debate, be put, in neoclassical
theory, on a par with rainfall or the plague?

The question of the

money supply, as important as it is today, is irrelevant within the
terms of neoclassical theory.

We saw above that the consequences of

monetary changes were of little significance; they are restricted to
absolute prices and had nothing to do with the important variables,
namely relative prices and output.

This theory is the product of an

age when the economy was not studied in macroeconomic terms.

Money is,

after all, a macroeconomic variable, and the situational determinism
talked about by Latsis is microeconomic.

It applies only to micro-

economic agents.

Conclusion
This chapter was a discussion of neo-Walrasian monetary theory as
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part of the neoclassical program to which it belongs.

The chapter also

elaborated on situational determinism which characterizes the monetary
behavior of microeconomic agents.

This situational determinism does

not apply, however, to the supply of money.

The neoclassical theory

has nothing to say about the determination of the quantity of money,
which is, in any event, a variable of minor relevance to the model.

It

bears stressing that the agents mentioned in the neoclassical program
are strictly microeconomic agents.
The reader will recall that an instruction in the neoclassical
positive heuristic in Chapter 1 asked the theorist to make the model
as realistic as possible.

In pursuit of this objective, Clower and

Burstein, for example, adapt the Archibald and Lipsey model- presented
diagrammatically above (see section on the real balance effect, page
above) to an economy which has financial assets and liabilities.^'*'
Financial intermediation leaves the neutrality of money intact.

De

spite adaptations of this kind,.the neoclassical program is limited in
its applicability to practical, macroeconomic policy issues.

The

following chapter looks at radical, macroeconomic departures from the
program, and attempts to construct a Keynesian program as a counterpart
to the neoclassical.
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Chapter Notes

^This section puts together some of the ideas contained in D. Patinkin,
Money, interest and prices, an integration of monetary and value
theory, 2nd edition, New York: Harper and Row, 1965 (part 1); F. H.
Hahn, "The rate of interest and the general equilibrium analysis,"
Economic Journal, 1955, 65, pp. 52-56; G. L. S. Shackle, "Recent
theories concerning the nature and role of interest," Surveys of
economic theory, volume 1, prepared for the American Economic
Association and the Royal Economic Society, London: Macmillan,
1965. Other relevant surveys are contained in H. G. Johnson,
"Monetary theory and policy" and "Recent developments in monetary
theory," both reprinted in R. S. Thorn, Ed., Monetary theory and
policy, major contributions to contemporary thought, New York:
Praeger, 1976.
^P. Mini, Philosophy and economics, Gainesville, Florida: University
Presses of Florida, 1974, especially Chapters 6 and 7.
^There is another dichotomy within the first six equations. The subset
(1) through (3) determines s, i and r, while q, L and W/P are deter
mined separately inequations (4) through (6).
^If the economy had only one commodity, money may or may not be needed.
But what is being discussed here is a model with only one commodity,
where a number of commodities is collapsed, for purposes of simpli
fication, into one.
5The next four paragraphs reproduce the neo-Walrasian equilibrium ana
lysis contained in G. C. Archibald and R, G. Lipsey, "Monetary and
value theory: a critique of Lange and Patinkin," Review of Economic
Studies, 1958, 26, pp. 1-22. The diagrammatic presentation may en
counter the objection that the vertical axis represents a timeindependent stock entity, while the horizontal axis measures a timedependent flow. However, there is nothing wrong in entrusting the
rational agent with a choice between a stock and a flow.
^J. R. Hicks, Value and capital, 2nd edition, Oxford:
Press, 1946.

Oxford University

^P. A. Samuelson, "What classical and neo-classical monetary theory
really was," Canadian Journal of Economics, 1968, JL, No. 1, pp. 1-15.
% o r the sake of completeness, this note adds a general equilibrium
model for a monetized economy (Model 2 below), patterned after P. A
Samuelson, (op. cit.) and two additional models for comparison.
Model 1 contains six equilibrium conditions for a nonmonetized
economy where capital (K) is the numeraire, and solves for 6 unknowns
Pf/PRj
w /pK ’ r > Ql> ^2* T^e p 's stand for nominal money
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Chapter note 8, continued

Model

1

(1)

(2 )

<Sf/6L = W/Pk

(3)

of/6K = r

(4)

UQ1

P 1/PK

UQ1Q1 + UQ2Q 2

UQ2
UQ2<*2 +

+ rK

_
u qiq i

(5)

P 2/PK

(6)
+ rK
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Chapter note 8, continued

Model 3

Model 2

K

\ MCK

(1)

I

_/M
K
\M
CK/

(2)

6f/6L ■= W/PK
6f/6K =

2

r

V PK

UQ1

UqiQi +

u q 2q2

+

V

P2/pK

UQlQ l * UQ2Q2 + V

WL/Pk + r (K+M)

UQlQl +

M = M

tl

II

(3)

tl

II

W

II

II

(5)

II

It

(6)

II

It

WL/Pr + r(K+M)

UQ2

r

UM

(7)
u q 2q 2

+

V

Same as in Model 2.

WL/Pk + r (K+M)

1/PV

UM
V ^ l + UQ2Q2 +UMM

(8)

Same as in Model 2.
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prices. W is the nominal wage; r is the interest rate; the Q ’s are
the two final commodities. The two factors of production, L (labor)
and K are in fixed supply; replacement capital maintains the capital
stock at a constant level. The production function is of the
Rarasey-Solow type; the ratio of the marginal cost of each commodity
to the marginal cost of capital is constant. Hence the derivation
of marginal equivalences (1) and (2). U represents the utility
function; f the production function.
Monetization requires the inclusion of a new set of utility
maximizing equivalences:
(5), (6 ), and (7) in Model 2. U is homo
geneous of degree zero in 11 and all the P's. In this model, equa
tions (1) through (7) contain seven unknowns: ^ i /Pr ’ P2 ^ K ’
r > Q] > Q2 anc^
The addition of the eighth equation introduces
the money supply and allows for the solution of a further unknown:
in place of the seven unknowns above, we can now solve for Pj^, Pj_,
P 2 , W, r, Q-^, Q 29 and M. In other words, equation (8 ) determines
all absolute prices.
We shall now have a closer look at factor prices in Model 2.
Here W/Pjr represents the rate of exchange of labor for final goods
(expressed in capital units) in the factor marketplace. Equation
(3) states that this rate of exchange will equal, in equilibrium,
the rate of exchange of labor for output (expressed in capital
units) in the production process. Likewise, the interest rate r
represents the amount of output (expressed in capital units) earned
by one unit of capital per unit of time, and equals (in equation (4)
the rate of exchange of capital per unit of time for output (express
ed in capital units). Note, however, that the interest rate serves
in this model also as the cost of money, in contrast to our earlier
procedure where we had the price level fulfill that function. This
dual role of the interest rate rests on the notion of endowing money
with the function of a store of value. The interest rate represents,
for Samuelson, the return on alternative forms of wealth: in hold
ing money, the wealth holder loses the flow of services he would
have earned from these. The absolute price level, in contrast,
represents the quantity of the composite good that has to be foregone
in order to obtain a unit of money.
Whether the interest rate or the absolute price level is the
true price of money is a thorny issue, which will not be discussed
here. Should r in equation (7) of Model 2 be replaced by 1/P^j we
would end up with Model 3. Here, the first seven equations contain
seven unknowns: Pi/Pr» ^ 2 ^ K > ^/Pr» r » Ql> ^ 2 ’ anc* ^/^K> t*ie same
set of unknowns as in the first 7 equations of Model 2. The addi
tion of the eight equations permits, as before, the determination
of absolute prices.
Because of the homogeneity postulate, money is neutral in both
Model 2 and Model 3.
Of his model, Samuelson writes that, 11. . . correct neoclassi
cal theory does not lead to the narrow anti-Keynesian view of those
Chicago economists who allege that velocity of circulation is not a
function of interest rates." That much having been granted, one
hastens to add that, unlike Keynesian theory, neoclassical theory
does not allow the money supply to influence the interest rate, even
though the interest rate enters into the demand function for money.
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^On this matter, see also S. Ahmad, "Is money net wealth?," Oxford
Economic Papers, 1970, 22^, pp. 357-361.
■*-fy)ne may argue that our earlier account of the mpnetary process— the
part where we looked at the money supply in real terms, and which
we later rejected in favor of an analysis in nominal terms— over
stated the power of monetary changes. Archibald and Lipsey (note
5 above) use the concepts of the Walrasian auctioneer and tatonnement to analyze the periods between equilibrium. By their account,
upon a change in the money supply— suppose the money supply is
doubled— the system goes into disequilibrium, trading is suspended
and the auctioneer is called to duty. No trading takes place until
the auctioneer calls the equilibrium prices, at which point all
prices are double their previous-equilibrium level. Also at this
point, the real money stock will be back at its original level. By
this sort of approach, monetary changes influence what goes on dur
ing tatonnement, but have no effect whatsoever on trading. One
cannot conclude that monetary changes have no effect on economic
transactions, since the dealings of the auctioneer during the
tatonnement constitute economic transactions. However, monetary
changes have no effect on the actual, "real" trading. This leads
Archibald and Lipsey to conclude that "[for] those well-known
propositions of the quantity theory which are propositions in com
parative statics, the real-balance effect is irrelevant."
H. Clower and M. L. Burstein, "On the invariance of demand for
cash and other assets," Review of Economic Studies, 1960, 28, pp.
32-36.

CHAPTER 3

KEYNESIAN THEORY

The controversy over what Keynes really meant is not relevant to
our study.

In the light of our discussion on methodology in Chapter 1,

what is significant is not so much what Keynes said as what he was
understood to have said.

Social scientists become important not on the
v

basis of what they "really" say, but rather by virtue of their contri
bution to the direction of thought in their discipline.

The work of

one author is likely to form only part of a research program, and the
success of a program will depend on the generation and later corrobora
tion of testable hypotheses over long stretches of time rather than on
the strength of one particular theory or set of theories.

It follows

that an understanding of the major currents in Keynesian thinking is
more important than the literal significance of the General Theory or
any other major Keynesian work.

This is not, however, to deny the rele

vance of Clower, Leijonhufvud, Hines and others who sought the "real"
meaning of the General Theory, since these authors not only contributed
useful insights into Keynesian theory, but also represent a significant,
if not major undercurrent in modern economics.
Describing Keynesian theory, to be juxtaposed against its neoclas
sical counterpart, could be a difficult task.

A student educated along

Anglo-American lines will probably recognize the transition from the
neoclassical to the Keynesian model by a switch from the microeconomic
(including a theory of general equilibrium rich in microeconomic detail)

53

54
to the macroeconomic, with solutions involving disequilibrium (particu
larly in the labor market) becoming a routine matter.

Fiscal policy,

while not excluded from neoclassical theory, becomes more of a panacea.
Monetary policy, which was quite impotent in the neoclassical model,
becomes theoretically significant, but very serious doubts emerge as to
its efficacy.
Keynesian theory as we have come to know it is certainly no
thoroughbred.

Mating it with neoclassicism was a major effort of Alvin

Hansen, Bent Hansen, Hicks and others, and the success of the breeding
may account for our difficulties in spelling out what makes a theory
Keynesian.

Take for example, Bent Hansen's variant of Klein's version

of the Keynesian model.-*-

Klein's original is on the left; as rewritten

in a supply-and-demand format by Hansen on the right.
S/p
I/p
I
M/p
Y
q
w/p
Ns

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

f(r,Y/p)
g(r,Y/p)
S
L(r,Y/p)
pq
q(N)
ql(N)
h(w/p)

C/p
I/p
Y/p
Y/p
qs
Nd
Ns
M d/p
M s/p
Md

= f*(r,Y/p)
= g(r,Y/p)
= C/p + I/p
= qs
= qs(Nd)
q_1(w/p)
= h(w/p)
- L(r,Y/p)
= M/p
= Ms

The addition of a labor-market equilibrium equation (N = N s) would
transform either model into a neoclassical model.

If instead we add an

identity defining the exogenously determined wage, we end up with a
Keynesian model.

The one on the right would have 11 equations to solve

11 unknowns, among which would be the price level.

Indeed, if we re

write all the equations in real terms and omit the price-level variable
we are left with the spectacle of a Keynesian model which is overdeter
mined for lack of a price level variable.

Hansen sought to demonstrate
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that rewriting a Keynesian model in a supply-and-demand format would
transform it into a special, rigid-wage, case of the neoclassical model.
Before we come to grips with the Hansen model on the right, a few
introductory comments are in order.

As with the model in Chapter 2,

Hansen's neoclassical version can be segmented into two parts:

the

first seven equations plus the labor market equation determine C/p, r,
Y/p, I/p, qs , N^, Ng and w/p, while the last three determine M^,
p.

and

In other words, the model complies with the neoclassical dichotomy

of real from monetary variables.

While the price level is determined

exclusively in the monetary sector, the determination of the interest
rate lies squarely in the real sector:

the Hicksian IS-LM synthesis

(yet to be born, in 1937) is unknown here.
tion raised in Chapter 2 can be asked again:

The same fundamental ques
if p were determined

purely in the monetary sector, how can it honestly perform its function
as the relative price of goods in terms of money?

A true relative price

will influence the desired ratios of goods to money, but also will it
self be influenced by the supply of either.
The inclusion of income as a determinant of consumption and invest
ment must have raised the eyebrows of many a neoclassicist.

Optimal

allocation is a matter of relative prices and in the neoclassical tradi
tion, income is no constraint since the economic agent can borrow his
way across time periods with complete disregard for his current income.
So there is no way to derive logically a general equilibrium model with
an income constraint if one's starting point is a partial microeconomic
model, as it should be when one is building a general equilibrium model.
Fallacy of composition?

Hardly; it is true that an entire society, in

a closed model (that is, one without international commerce) cannot
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borrow or lend, but a general equilibrium model builds from microagent
behavior upwards, and intertemporal relative prices in such a model will
ensure there is no net borrowing or lending at the macroeconomic level.
Glower’s observation^ on the addition of income constraints in macro
economics— that they reflect the recognition that when markets do not
clear and "false trading" (that is, exchange at non-equilibrium prices)
takes place, less-than-equilibrium or constrained incomes are a neces
sary independent variable in demand functions— led to Leijonhufvud’s
well-known reinterpretation of Keynes.^
But disequilibria in the Walrasian sense are difficult to discuss
in the context of Hansen’s Keynesian model, where the labor market is
in permanent disequilibrium.
also be out of equilibrium.

By Walras’ Law, one other equation should
The excess supply in the labor market will

be matched by an excess demand in this other equation for a net excess
demand of zero in all markets.

But which equation?

The money market

is said to clear, usually at an equilibrium interest rate.
us with the output market.

This leaves

The problem with this market is that no

prices are included among the independent variables in the output demand
equations.

Indeed, the absence of prices from those two equations would

seem to place the Hansen model out of range of Walras' Law.

So our

suggestion above that prices be included in the output demand equation
bears rethinking:

the model is damned in neoclassical eyes if the out

put demand equations lack the price variable, but if a price variable
is included, it is still damned, since it will certainly fail the test
of Walras’ Law, unless it allows for the money or output markets to be
in permanent equilibrium.
On the incompatibility of his model with Walras' Law, Hansen writes
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that
the answer . . . seems to be that in Keynesian theory, workers
are assumed not to expect to sell all the labour which they
supply. They expect to sell only what is actually demanded.
Their expected income is therefore smaller than the value of
their supply of labour and equal to what they actually happen
to sell. . . .5
Why the expectations of workers with regard *to uwrket clearance are
formed in a manner different from those of other economic agents is
never explained.
The foregoing suggests some logical problems in dressing the
Keynesian model in neoclassical clothes, but we need a stronger criter
ion to help us determine the connection, if any, between the two, or
whether the two schools are completely irreconcilable.

Say’s Law
Such a criterion can perhaps be found in Chapter 1, particularly
after page

9.

There, the discussion of Lakatos suggested that differ

ent programs generate different testable hypotheses, and then the
progress or otherwise of a program depends on whether these hypotheses
are corroborated.
sciences.

This procedure is especially suitable for the natural

In the social sciences, however, one has to keep in mind that

hypotheses often take the form of policy recommendations and that corro
boration could then come in the form of a successful policy outcome.
Seen in this light, the Keynesian-neoclassical dispute represents a
clash between irreconcilable policy recommendations.

It may be seen to

revolve around the one crucial policy question:

how well do markets

fulfill their function of allocating resources?

The one fundamental

premise underlying neoclassical economics is that they are uniquely
suited for the job.

Keynesian economics on the other hand casts a
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serious doubt.

Dressing a Keynesian model in neoclassical clothes may

be useful to facilitate the conversion of members of the profession
whose hearts belong to the Keynesian philosophy but whose upbringing
was elsewhere.

In line with our discussion in Chapter 1, a switch in

research programs can be especially hard on the old guard.

The protec

tive belt of a young progressive program may well veer toward the con
tent of the competing degenerating program; this would make the transi
tion easier for all.
This argument can be usefully recast in terms of Say’s Law.
Hutt's interpretation,6 Say’s Law can be expressed as follows:

By
If

prices are allowed to find their own level, no resources will be unem
ployed.

Equivalently, any unemployment of resources can be attributed

to some activity which incapacitates the workings of the market and
prevents the emergence of equilibrium prices.

If Say’s Law is accepted,

the policy implication would follow that unemployment of, say, labor
can be attributed to monopolistic or monopsonistic practices which ob
struct the emergence of an equilibrium real wage.

Unemployment in such

circumstances would be due not to a lack of aggregate demand, but to a
deficiency of supply.

This belief in the smooth workings of the market

goes hand in hand with the recommendation against government super
imposing itself on the market, and against monopoly- or monopsonyinduced distortions.

Expanding government expenditures will not pull

the economy out of a recession, since such an expansion would consti
tute an increase in demand, which is the wrong medicine.

Breaking up

the monopolies or labor unions would break the stranglehold on the free
movement of prices, and expand supply, leading the economy back to full
employment.
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If Say’s Law is not accepted, however, the policy maker would be
well advised to add directly to the employment of resources, since in
the absence of such government involvement markets cannot be entrusted
with the task of finding the appropriate prices for full employment.
The presence or absence of money does not alter the argument in
the least from the point of view of the proponents of Say’s Law.

In

the eyes of the supporters of the price mechanism, the concept of with
held demand is absurd.

Selling one’s products and retaining the pro

ceeds in the fora of money rather than buying other people's products
can in no way cause unemployment.'

The most that can happen is the

emergence of a new set of relative prices.

A new equilibrium will

emerge consonant with the structure of preferences.
premises are transparent:

Two underlying

holding money is as rational a choice as that

involved in any economic decision; furthermore, the market can handle
such an eventuality with as much ease as it can handle any switch in
preferences.

For the opponents of Say’s Law, on the other hand, money

is the very stuff of disequilibria.

If markets cannot be trusted to

generate equilibria, the money market is likely to end up as Walrasian
receptacle of the excess demand counterpart to the excess supply of
labor and other unemployed resources.
Supporters of the market mechanism are likely to prefer using
microeconomic models, since it is only within such a framework that the
market can display its ability to allocate resources appropriately.
The result is the neoclassical microeconomic research program of
Chapter I.

Quirk and Saposnik

7

might well argue that macroeconomics is

a special case of the general equilibrium model, where the complexity
of the latter is reduced to a model with one consumer, one producer
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plus the government.

The fact remains, however, that the intricate web

of relative prices and the attendant allocative process is all but lost
in Keynesian macroeconomics.

Hansen's model above is less than neoclas

sical in at least that one major aspect.
Keynesian macroeconomics is by its very nature unsympathetic to the
workings of the market, and this is reflected in its methodology.
Method in Keynes seems to have followed Keynes' reading of his environ
ment; witness this quotation from The Economic Consequences of Sterling
O
Parity:

". . . we run a risk of reaching the wrong conclusion . . .

if we continue to apply the principles of an Economics

which was worked

out on the hypothesis of laisser-faire and free competition to a society
which is rapidly abandoning these hypotheses."
In the language of Simon (Chapter 1 above) the decomposition in
Keynesian models stops at a macroeconomic level.

For the most part,

they ignore microeconomic variables, and as a result, the method of
specification ignores the web of microeconomic relationships.

Portfolio Balance
The portfolio-balance method is nowadays very popular among macro
economists, and its appeal is common to both Keynesians and non-Keynes
ians.

Because of the latter, we shall return to it in the next chapter,

but at this stage it is pertinent to mention that Keynes is regarded by
Patinkin^ as the founder of the concept of the transmission mechanism
in the modern sense of the word.

Portfolio adjustment is a domino-like

effect in the relative price structure of assets and appears to be a
sophisticated exercise in price adjustment, rich in disaggregated de
tail.
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Patinkin attributes to Keynes the modern notion of money as a
stock.

Prior to Keynes, money was perceived as a flow; the demand for

money was related to income, itself a flow.

The detachment of money

from income, and the consequent movement away from the medium-of-exchange function towards the store-of-value function began with the
Cambridge equation of exchange and culminated in Keynes, where money
started to be treated as a stock.

The portfolio owner holds money as

well as other assets in a ratio consistent with the price structure of
assets, and a change in the volume of money would require a new set of
relative prices among assets.

As elaborated by T o b i n , t h e particular

substitutability amongst the various financial assets and then between
these and real, physical assets will determine the transmission of the
initial monetary change through a path leading to the ultimate impact
on the real economy.
It should be noted in passing, however, that the Keynesian mechan
ism has none of the complexities of, say, Friedman's model, which will
be dealt with in Chapter 4.
three assets:

The Keynesian model can be said to contain

money, financial capital and real capital.

two are substitutes.

The latter

This contrasts with Friedman's mechanism, where

the variety of channels and the multitude of variables involved suggests
a higher regard for microeconomic detail and the allocative role of
relative prices.
Deference to microeconomics and the subjective, individualistic
method is evident also in a much earlier work:
Credit by Ludwig von Ilises.^

The Theory of Money and

It must be granted that even though the

original German text came out well before the General Theory, portfolio
adjustment per se was not alien to von Mises, Patinkin's claims on
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behalf of Keynes notwithstanding.

Von Mises writes:

He who has more money on hand than he thinks he needs, will buy,
in order to dispose of the superfluous stock of money that lies
useless on his hands. If he is an entrepreneur, he will possi
bly enlarge his business. If this use of money is not open to
him, he may purchase interest-bearing securities; or possibly
he may decide to purchase consumption goods. But in any case,
he expresses by a suitable behavior in the market the fact that
he regards his reserve of purchasing power as too large.12
One must do justice to Patinkin's position and admit that von Mises
never talks of a relative asset price structure corresponding to the
set of asset stocks.

Yet if one reads on, The Theory of Money and

Credit, as well as other Austrian-school literature, provide

more than

a clue as to why such a development had to await the General Theory.
As the next section shows, an Austrian-type method would deal with
money in a disaggregated fashion, while the macroeconomic portfolio
approach (Keynesian or otherwise) deals with the macroeconomic consequ
ences of a monetary change, primarily on the interest rate and on asset
prices.

A Microeconomic, Individualistic Treatment of Saving.
Investment and Money
Saving can be viewed as the expression of a preference of future
goods over present goods.

Likewise, investment can be regarded as the

manifestation of a preference for present over future goods.

In other

words, investors demand capital goods at the present time, and will be
in a position to supply in the future goods produced with the help of
these capital goods.

That the demand for present goods is made against

the offer of claims on future goods rather than against the future
goods themselves does not in itself influence our eventual conclusions.
At this stage, therefore, we can ignore the web of financial
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intermediation which stands atop real transactions.

Instead of a market

where saving and investment are equated at an equilibrium interest rate,
there is the supply and demand for commodities— as usual, except that
commodities are delivered in different time periods, and the prices
determined in the various markets are the prices of the commodities each
defined as of a particular point in time.

The interest rate can now be

defined as the ratio of the price of a commodity at a future point in
time to the price of the same commodity at the present time.

There is

no reason why the ratio for one good should be the same as for any other
good, except that as the economy moves towards equilibrium differences
in such ratios would lead to a reallocation of resources until uniform
ratios are established throughout the economy by the time the next
general equilibrium is achieved.
An increase in savings can now be interpreted as an increased pre
ference of future over present goods.
of future for present goods.

This changes the rate of exchange

The quantity of present goods exchanging

for the same quantity of future goods rises, implying a decline in the
rate of interest.

For example, whereas before the switch in preferences

towards saving, 100 units of a present good exchanged for 106 units of
that same good in the future, implying an interest rate of 6%, now 101
units of the present good will exchange for 106 units in the future,
equivalent to an interest rate of under 6q.

The price of present goods

in terms of future goods will fall; the price of future goods rises as
will the price of claims on future goods, if we incorporate financial
intermediation into our analysis.

In other words, the price of an

asset and the yield on such an asset move in opposite directions.
Money can be integrated into such an approach without undue

difficulty.
vices.

Newly-issued money constitutes a claim on goods and ser

Here it can be perceived as a flow of claims filtering down to

microeconomic agents, and prompting a redistribution within the economy.
Whether the interest will rise or fall depends on whether the recipients
prefer future goods to present goods or vice versa.

It may so happen

that if the government, for example, transfers newly-created money to
poor recipients of public welfare funds, the consequent redistribution
would probably raise the price of present goods in terms of future goods.
Conversely the usual prediction of a drop in the interest rate upon an
increase in the quantity of money will obtain if a redistribution occurs
leading to an increased preference for future goods.
There remains, however, a fundamental difference between an in
crease in saving which results from a change in preferences amongst
economic agents and one which ensues from a redistribution of wealth
following an increase in the quantity of money which favors those in
whose preference structure future goods feature more prominently.

A

change in preference leads to a permanent change in the interest rate,
reflecting an alteration in the equilibrium rate of exchange of future
for present goods.

When a redistribution occurs as a result of monetary

expansion, on the other hand, the subsequent change in interest rate can
be viewed as a superimposition on the economy which is more likely to be
reversed as the proceeds of the initial monetary expansion are respent
over and over again.

A theoretical model with the appropriate institu

tional detail can be set up to guarantee the long-term neutrality of
money.^
The distinguishing characteristic of the approach discussed above
is perhaps that the interest rate is determined in periods of
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disequilibrium as well as in equilibrium, along with all other relative
prices, through an intricate web of microeconomic activity.

With the

appropriate institutional backdrop, more elaborate models can be set
up.

In Hayek, for example, the effects of a monetary expansion on the

methods of production are looked at in detail.

Production is broken up

into various stages which link present goods at one end to future goods
at the other.

A switch in preferences towards future goods will not

merely raise the price of future goods and make the production of such
f
goods more attractive, but will also make production at any stage of
production more attractive relative to earlier stages, thereby prompt
ing a lengthening of the production process.

The short-run effects of

a monetary expansion can also be viewed through the use of a similar
theoretical apparatus.
The Keynesian portfolio approach, in contrast, is essentially a
macroeconomic approach, and by virtue of its macro nature, is able to
handle money as an aggregate quantity.

Instead of viewing an increase

in the quantity of money as an increase in the claims (on goods and
services) made available to so many microeconomic agents, whereupon the
disposal of such claims leads to the eventual repercussions on the real
economy, now we can talk directly of a market for money at a macroscale
determining a macroeconomic interest rate which in the Keynesian age
came to be viewed as the price of money.

There is nothing logically

incorrect with the asset-price and interest rate movements which the
Tobin-Keynesian theory predicts will occur across the macro-portfolio
of assets following a monetary expansion.

Likewise it is logically

acceptable to posit perfect substitutability between financial assets
(other than money) and real assets.

i
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After all, assuming away
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differences in risk, assets enter preference structures only via their
rates of return.

Yet this new method, which instructs the theorist to

analyze economic activity in macroscopic terras has the advantage of
viewing money, a macro quantity, in suitable theoretical dimensions,
but the disadvantage of possibly missing relevant microeconomic detail.

A Keynesian Research Program
In a Lakatosian reconstruction of Keynesian theories, the positive
heuristic veers the theorist away from the microeconomic, in a manner
which distinguishes the resulting theories both from the neoclassical
types we saw in Chapter 2 as well as the Austrians presented in this
chapter.

The Keynesian theorist is also required to address himself or

herself to policy questions.

This mission is not inconsistent with the

Austrian school, but is removed from the Walrasian theories of Chapter
2.

The Keynesian positive heuristic would read:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Construct aggregative economic models.
Minimize the non-economic content.
Analyze macroeconomic stabilization.
Adapt the models to make them as acceptable
as possible to neoclassicists.

The first instruction sets the macroeconomic tone.
instructs the theorist to avoid non-economic content.

The second
In particular,

Keynesian models generally avoid sociological and political detail.
The result is a situational determinism, which is different from that
of microeconomic models and which will be the subject of the conclusion
of this chapter.

The third instruction permits the theorist to study

systems which to a neoclassicist were unstable or in short-term disequilibria.

The fourth heuristic is an exercise in public relations

and an appeasement of the old guard.
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The hard core of the Keynesian program consists of one proposition:
(i)

Economic activity is the outcome of the interaction
of private markets and macroeconomic policy.

History of the Keynesian Program
Had we regarded Keynesian theory as belonging in the protective
belt of the neoclassical program, then the 40's, 50's and part of the
60's would have had to be viewed as a time of re-invigoration and pro
gression in neoclassicism, thanks to Keynesian addenda, after the
debacle and regression of the Great Depression.

If, on the other hand,

we view Keynesianism, as we have in this chapter, as a separate research
program, the history of its component theories is a good example of a
Lakatosian degenerating program.

The verdict on the matter depends, of

course, on one's particular views of the history of Keynesianism.

Here,

however, is one attempt at a Lakatosian reconstruction of the develop
ment of Keynesian thought.
1.

The starting point must be the 45-degree model of Alvin Hansen

and Paul Samuelson, which was strictly macroeconomic and which had
little to say about the absolute price level at all output positions
short of full employment.

The model came

hand in hand with therecom

mendation for an active fiscal policy.
2.

The Hicksian IS-LM m o d e l ^ was primarily a theoretical refine

ment, although it has since undergone independent testing.

In the very

early formulations of Keynesianism, the interest rate determined the
level of investment, which in turn determined (via the multiplier)

the

level of income; yet the latter was itself a determinant, in the liqui
dity function, of the interest rate.

The

IS-LM technique integrated

the

system, and an ignominious circularity in logic was transformed into a
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model with as many equations as it has unknowns.
3.

In Keynesian theory, emphasis is switched away from price ad

justment (the sort of adjustment which is the essence of a well-func
tioning market system) to quantity adjustment.

By the very nature of

this departure, which plays down the role of price fluctuations as an
equilibrating mechanism in the market economy, Keynesian theory should
have lost its credentials as a credible explanation of the inflationary
process, which consists after all of a sequence of price movements.
Since the early Keynesian models downplayed the role of price changes,
let alone came up with adequate proposals for controlling inflation,
the protective belt eventually had to be adjusted, to incorporate for
mally the rate of inflation into the program.

The program came up with

additional testable hypotheses and was in a position to progress if
these hypotheses were corroborated.
Despite the potential inconsistency, Keynesian theory by its very
formulation lends itself quite readily to an investigation of the in
flationary process.

Firstly, it operates in easily understood terms of

aggregate supply and aggregate demand, and by bringing price adjustment
back into the picture, Keynesian theory can easily attribute inflation
ary pressures to excess aggregate demand.

Secondly, Keynesians often

presume an exogenous money wage rate and what market forces do not
determine— the wage rate— easily becomes a function of a variety of
"non-economic" candidates.

Hence the "cost-push" theories of inflation.

As a result we find two kinds of Keynesian explanation of the inflation
ary process.

With the quantity theoriests, Keynesians shared the

demand-pull explanation, albeit of a non-monetary type.

In conflict

with the quantity theorists, Keynesians had a cost-push explanation
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totally at odds with the idea that only market pressures pull prices up.
The two explanations lead to diverging policy recommendations.

The

demand-pull variant called for a reduction in aggregate demand as a
corrective; the cost-push variant called for a repression of the rele
vant causal factors.
wide as it seems.

The difference between the two however is not as

Both remedies are of a non-monetary nature.

the two explanations are empirically indistinguishable:

Besides,

any opponent

of the cost-push explanation is bound to be open-minded enough about
the matter of lags to attribute seemingly cost-push price movements at
any point in time to demand pressures any length of time before.
The cost-push version was undoubtedly the worse of the anathema
from the quantity theorists point of view.

Any delving into spontane

ous or exogenous (rather than market-pressure induced) change in prices
or wages required explanations outside the boundaries of conventional
economics.

Referring to a term coined by Thorp and Quandt, Bronfen-

brenner and Holtzman write that
the term "new inflation" embodies the opinion that the strength
of economic pressure groups . . ., together with increased
public concern with unemployment, had increased the likeli
hood . . . of "disequilibrium" price and wage increases being
validated by expansive monetary and fiscal policies, resulting
from organized pressure on monetary and fiscal authorities.15
This sounds like the starting point of a new sociological or political
approach to inflation, but what follows in the same article is an
apologetic review (reminiscent of heuristic d on page 66) of what cir
cumstances would cause a cost-push deviation from the perfectly competi
tive norm.

The discussion deals with such issues as price inelasticity

in the product market, and low factor-market elasticity of substitution,
which would permit cost-push pressures to succeed.

The major motivation

behind trade union pressure on wages is said to be not the cost-ofliving increases or the profits earned by the employer, but rather
"neighboring strategic wage rates," and then only- in the absence of
perfect labor mobility.
A major development in the Keynesian treatment of inflation was
1
the appearance in the protective belt of the Phillips curve, D which
could be regarded as a Keynesian theory of inflation in its own right,
with its own attendant hypotheses.
testable hypotheses.

The program again came up with new

An alternative, somewhat cynical view would sug

gest that the inability of Keynesian-oriented politicians to solve the
problem of unemployment led theorists to propose a model indicating the
necessity for some unemployment if inflation were to be kept in check.
By this view, refutation came in the form of policy-failure.

Inability

to solve the problem of unemployment led to a minor switch in policy.
Loyalty to an overall Keynesian philosophy remained, but the fullemployment objective now meant less than strictly full employment.

In

pseudo-Lakatosian terms, a minor change in policy accompanied a change
in the protective belt, in the same way as a major, radical change in
policy (such as occurred in the 1930’s and 1940's) perhaps accompanies
a change in the hard-core itself, and therefore a switch in programs.
4.

The next watershed in the Keynesian saga came with the episode

of the shifting Phillips curves.^

When the simultaneous deterioration

in inflation and unemployment conflicted with the Phillips hypothesis,
the protective belt was repeatedly modified to appoint expectations,
trade union power and so on as shift variables in the Phillips relation
ship.

The Phillips curve was able to explain everything after the

event, but its predictive abilities were now inadequate.

Ad hoc
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modifications helped to salvage temporarily the Phillips hypothesis,
but, as a decompositional and specificational device which isolated the
interaction of wage and price movements, it was refuted; the Keynesian
program was again degenerating.

Insofar as corroboration or refutation

are at least partly a function of the events of the time, the environ
ment of theorists and econometricians has a lot to do with the health
of a program.
5.

Degeneration in the program was evident in Tobin's presidential

address to the American Economic Association in 1971.1®

The message was

"Ignore inflation and concentrate on the full-emplovment objective."
Here was an ill-fated attempt to revert to the specificational procedures
of the 1940's, when it was politically safe to ignore inflation.

The

Keynesian program seems to be approaching another attempt at resuscita
tion:

Klein's address to the A.E.A. in 1978 called for more considera

tion to be given to aggregate supply in macroeconomic stabilization
policy.19

Conclusion
The propositions of the neoclassical research program formulated by
Latsis (and reproduced in Chapter 1 above, page 15) are designed for the
generation of microeconomic models.

In particular, the decision-makers

of proposition (i) of the hard-core are obviously very well-informed
microeconomic agents.

As such, this proposition is not suitable for the

generation of Keynesian models, where macroeconomic agents— or policy
makers— are knowledgeable about the economic situation, but where microeconomic agents, to the extent they are included at all in such models,
may not be. (Hence, for example, the neoclassical interpretation of
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microeconomic behavior in the conventional Phillips curve scenario sug
gests that trade unionists are poor predictors of the future path of the
price level.)

Also, proposition (iv), asserting the self-regulating

nature of the economy, is out of place in a Keynesian program, which
highlights the need for macroeconomic intervention to stabilize the
economy.
As I pointed out in the section entitled "Say’s Law" in this
chapter, Keynesian theories compete, in a Lakatosian sense, with neo
classical microeconomic theories.
ferent from that of the other:

The positive heuristic of one is dif

the Keynesian theorist is directed to a

theoretical apparatus different from that of the neoclassical microeconomic economist.
differ.

In addition, the nature of the recommendations

Keynesian theories,unlike their neoclassical microeconomic

counterparts, generate short-term stabilization policy recommendations
for macroeconomic policy-makers.
The next task was to suggest a hard-core and a positive heuristic
for a Keynesian research program.

The positive heuristic of the Keynes

ian program instructs the economist to concentrate on aggregative rela
tionships.

The philosophy as well as the method of the program reflect

the dethronement of the microeconomic approach and the accompanying
belief in the workings of the market system.

Keynesian macroeconomics

is better suited for the study of stabilization policy and became neces
sary with the growing stature of government in modern economies.
Chapter 1 discussed the situational determinism manifested in neo
classical microeconomic theory.

The typical microeconomic model is set

up in such a way that the economic agents will automatically resort to
the point of equilibrium.

This type of arrangement was called

situational determinism, and is facilitated by the use of the substan
tive, rather than the procedural form of rationality, and by the abstrac
tion from sociological and other non-economic detail.

Notice that in

macroeconomics too, the abstraction from non-economic— particularly
political and sociological— detail allows the economist to make policy
recommendations, and if the policy-maker does not follow these recom
mendations, he is often said to have made a mistake.

The rationality

presumed of the policy-maker is, again, of the substantive type and in
these models, the policy-maker typically finds himself in a problem where
the logic of situation dictates a unique solution.

Occasionally the

problem is more complex, as when, for example, the policy-maker faces
the dilemma of the simple Phillips curve.

Economics, however, has little

to say in this situation about whether the policy-maker should opt for
less inflation or less unemployment.

But once that choice is made,

probably on political grounds, the path to that end is clearly laid
down by economic theory.
In the more straightforward situation, the macroeconomist typically
recommends, say, a cut in government expenditures to the newly elected
politician, whose pre-election promises might inhibit his ability to
accept the economists’ recommendation.

The situational logic of this

theorist’s recommendation is of course valid within the boundaries of
economics, but may be unacceptable to the politician who has to operate
outside those boundaries.
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CHAPTER 4

THE CONSERVATIVE WING

A major development in economics since the War, aside from the
Keynesian revolution, has been the later rise of monetarism.

The pro

fession has become a battleground between Keynesians and monetarists,
with the latter appearing to gain the edge as inflation becomes a more
pressing political issue, and in also line with the changing political
mood.

This chapter deals with monetarism and with a later development—

the emergence of the rational expectations hypothesis, which is, at
once, distinct from monetarism but in agreement with monetarism on
major policy recommendations.

This chapter will evaluate and compare

these two components of the conservative wing of economics— to each of
which is devoted a separate section.

The third and final section

attempts to fit each of the two schools into their respective research
programs.

Monetarism
Below is a list of the distinguishing characteristics of monetar
ism, at a theoretical, rather than policy implementation level.

The

purpose of this section is to link these characteristics with neo
classical microeconomics and with Keynesianism.
1.

The Inherent Stability of the Economic System. With its

foundations in general equilibrium analysis, this characteristic is
manifested in the monetarist assertion of a natural rate of unemployment,
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the stability of the demand function for money, the inclusion of perma
nent (rather than measured or current) income in all demand functions,
the exogeneity and the long-run neutrality of monetary aggregates (an
assertion founded in the zero-homogeneity in the prices and income of
the money-demand function), and the disavowal of policy activism of
any sort.1
Their condemnation of all forms of policy interference with market
processes leads monetarists to denounce the size of government spending
in modern-day budgets.

The expansion in the size of the government

leads, in the eyes of many monetarists, to the crowding out of the
private sector, through inflationary or non-inflationary means.

Re

course to the former route explains the persistence of inflationary
problems, which arise primarily from the nexus of the growing size
of government and the financing thereof through monetary expansion.
At the fore of the theoretical bridge-building between monetary and
fiscal expansion is the Brunner and Meltzer brand of fiscal monetarism. 2
In the line with their belief in the intrinsic stability of market
systems, monetarists downplay the contribution of external shocks to
the rate of inflation.

Accordingly, they exclude increases in the

prices of raw materials, agricultural price fluctuations and the like,
as sources of inflationary pressures.

Such factors, they say, induce

changes only in relative prices and resource allocation, but have no
effect on the rate of inflation, unless they are accommodated by mone
tary expansion.
2.

The Separation of the Allocative from the Aggregative.

In
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simpler terms, the microeconomics of resource allocation and relative
prices are compatible with, but distinct from macroeconomics, which
deals with aggregate levels of nominal variables, including the abso
lute price level.

The separation is reminiscent of, and indeed it is

based upon the Quantity Theory and the superimposition of the equation
of exchange upon a general equilibrium foundation.

The dichotomy shows

up in the reliance of most econometric monetarist literature on tests
of reduced-form equation systems which abstract from the sectoral and
allocative detail typical of Keynesian structural-equation systems.

3

(This particular point is discussed again at a later page.)
An inevitable consequence is the lack of emphasis by monetarists
on sectoral contributions to the inflationary process and on the distri
butional effects (among sectors and income groups) of monetary policy
and its inflationary effects.

From the monetarist viewpoint, a primary

distributional consequence of inflation is the shift of resources from
money holders to the issuers of money.

This effect is studied in the

context of a function relating the demand for money, in real terms, to
its determinants.

Agents in monetarist economics are considerably more

rational, and have access to a far wider range of information than their
Keynesian counterparts.

The demand for real money balances depends

partly upon the expected rate of inflation; this is because inflation
reduces the real value of money balances and is therefore an important
cost incurred by those who hold money.

Expectations of future infla

tion are in turn a function of the actual, current rate of inflation.
As a result, a rise in the rate of inflation, to the extent that it be
comes internalized in expectations of future inflation, increases the
cost of holding money, and therefore reduces the level of desired money
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holdings.

Such desired holdings, however, are measured in real terms,

and as a result monetarists point to a separate and conflicting effect:
money holders will maintain a desired, real stock- by accumulating nomi
nal balances at the same rate as the actual rate of inflation.

The

second of these effects constitutes a tax on money holders, the socalled inflation tax, the proceeds of which accrue to the issuers of
money.^
3.

Its Macroeconomic Nature, manifested by its emphasis on aggre

gate variables and its use of the macroeconomic portfolio-balance
method.

This characteristic is not usually mentioned by monetarists in

describing themselves, but it represents a major departure from the
neo-Walrasian monetary theory discussed in Chapter 2, and so it is per
tinent to our discussion.

The first two characteristics link monetarism

to its foundations; this characteristic asserts its primary purpose,
namely the study of the macroeconomy and the short-run effects of policy.
These three qualities sum up some major aspects of monetarism:

like

Keynesian theory, it deals with short-run, macroeconomic policy evalua
tion, but unlike Keynesian theory, it has deep microeconomic roots.
Monetarism is founded upon the equation of exchange, carried over from
the old Quantity Theory.

Like the quantity theorists, monetarists be

lieve in the exogeneity of the money supply.
There are however subtle differences between the old and the new,
reflecting pre-Keynesian but especially Keynesian influences on the in
terpretation of equation of exchange.

The old Quantity Theory stressed

the long-run neutrality of money and by the same token restricted the
scope of its analysis to the influence of monetary changes on the longrun determination of the price level:

in the long-run monetary changes
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leave relative prices and all other "real" variables unchanged.

The

modern variant, enunciated by the monetarists, represents a significant
compromise with the Keynesian concern with the short-run and concen
trates on questions dealing with short-run disequilibria.

Monetarists

acknowledge the short-run non-neutrality of money, and search for the
conditions which would ensure the short-run neutrality of policy.

Some

writers deny that short-run, disequilibrium periods were previously
ignored in economics; Blaug,^ for example, points to the writings of
Fisher and Marshall as places where short-run issues were indeed
studied.

Yet the strong emphasis on disequilibria typical of modern

macroeconomics emerged with Wicksell, came to a head with Keynesianism,
and is also contained in monetarism, which is in large part the analy
sis of the effects of monetary changes in the short run on both prices
and employment, in other words on both nominal as well as real vari
ables.
With these first three characteristics in mind, a comment is now
in order about the unity of monetarist thought.

There is disagreement

in the literature about this point, namely the question of how far one
can deviate from mainstream monetarism and still retain one's monetar
ist credentials.

Take, for example, the use of small, reduced-form

models by monetarists.

Milton Friedman pointed out, in private cor£

respondence with Mayer,

that the disputes between large and small

models are "almost entirely independent of the monetarist versus Keynes
ian points of view."

Mayer disagrees, and lists various reasons why small

models are intrinsic to the monetarist model.

One important reason is,

of course, the monetarist emphasis on the aggregative and their de
emphasis of the allocative and, therefore, the sectoral.

Also their
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belief in the inherent stability of the private sector permits monetar
ists to ignore the role of the private sector, and parts thereof, as
sources of instability.
Elsewhere, however, Mayer misses various other aspects of monetar
ist unity.

For example, while recognizing that the monetarist's aggre

gative, non-sectoral approach to the determination of the absolute price
level is consistent with the monetarist principles, he remarks neverthe
less that the monetarist "rejection of all cosh-push phenomena may well
be unwarranted even within the monetarist framework."

Suppose, he

writes, that one industry increases its total receipts by pushing its
prices upward, and then suppose that with a constant money supply (and
therefore constant total expenditures), other industries react to
shrinking demand by reducing production rather than by cutting prices.
The result would be an inflation without monetary expansion— a result,
says Mayer, which is entirely compatible with monetarist premises.
Maybe, but monetarists are unlikely to argue along Mayer's lines.

They

believe in a stable private sector, a stability based on a general
equilibrium model which presumes adequate forces of competition across
the economy.

Such a presumption would preclude the first industry from

getting away with its price heist and would discourage the quantity (as
against price) adjustment of other industries.

There is, I believe, an

undeniable unity among these first three characteristics of monetarism.
Perhaps they can be summed up into a definition of monetarism as an
aggregative or macroeconomic interpretation of neoclassical theory,
concerned with short-term and policy-related issues.

It is a policy

maker's cookbcok, entirely compatible with neoclassical economics.
The next pages deal with the fourth characteristic of monetarism,

jfSprfw*"’

82

and the one from which it derives its name.
4.

Despite their acknowledgement of the confluence of monetary or

fiscal policy, monetarists believe that the former is more potent, in
the sense that its effects are less ambiguous and more reliable.

What

is being discussed is not the long-term influence of monetary changes—
what Stein^ calls the Long-Run Quantity Theory— but rather the short
term potency of monetary changes.

Stein distinguishes between Fried

man’s argument to the effect that monetary changes are the primary cause
of changes in nominal income over the long-stretch and the St. Louis
thesis which stresses the short-term potency of money.
variant which is being discussed here.

It is the latter

Related to this point is the

monetarist assertion of the exogeneity of monetary aggregates.
The first three characteristics of monetarism can be related, in a
straightforward fashion to antecedents in economic thought.

This last

one and the attendant issues of the transmission process, however, are
more problematic, and are dealt with at some length in the following
few sections.

The Potency of Monetary Policy
As suggested
of

in point 2 of

the previous section,a significant part

the monetarist literature lacks detailed theoretical specification

and seeks validation for its generalizations directly from empirical
support.
of

For example, Friedman and Meiselman provide the generalities

a transmission mechanism but

they do not present aformal model.

St. Louis model consists of testable reduced-form equations which are
not derived from a larger set of structural equations.

The absence of

a detailed formal specification is not only consistent with, but is

The
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indeed a consequence of an additional aspect of the monetarist philos
ophy (not mentioned above) which is reminiscent of the Austrian school
discussed earlier:

policy decisions influence the private economy

through a wide variety of very intricate channels, a variety which
eludes simple formalization.

The process of specification— in other

words, the task of selecting the more important relationships between
the variables included in a model— is avoided in what is perhaps a mone
tarist reaction to Keynesian method.

As suggested earlier, monetarists

generally rely, in their empirical method, on the reduced-form procedure,
which merely tests the dependence of aggregate quantities on various
policy variables, but without starting from, and certainly without test
ing, a structural array of equations.
supporting methodology:

Friedman’s instrumentalism® is a

what matters is not the realism of the postu

lates of the theory, nor the degree of structural detail in its formal
models, but merely how accurately the theory predicts.
All this notwithstanding, two major monetarists— Brunner and
Meltzer— have published a long string of articles, containing formal and
intricate macroeconomic models.
periods.

Their analysis is in terms of distinct

In one Brunner^ article, the shortest period sees portfolio

reallocation and asset price adjustment after the issue of additional
financial instruments, such as money or securities.

The analysis is de

voted exclusively to the response within the asset markets.

For this

first period, Brunner suggests that the wealth effects of increased asset
supplies are small, and may therefore be ignored.-*-0 Next, the conse
quences of the first period are fed into the government budget process
and the process of financial stock-flow adjustment in an "intermediate
period" is then studied.

The final period introduces the limitations
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imposed by the real aspects of the economy; the contributions of fiscal
arrangements to long-run equilibrium are also analyzed.
Tobin-^ believes that portfolio adjustment theory— in particular
its assertion "that non-monetary events . . . will also affect the
attractiveness of accumulating capital assets"— ought to convince mone
tarists that they are wrong in attributing so much strength to monetary
policy.

But if one looks closely at the first of these three Brunner

periods, one finds an important part of the monetarist explanation for
the relative potency of monetary policy.
Wealth owners allocate their holdings over a range of assets, but
in equilibrium the distribution must be consistent with the set of asset
yields or prices.

Policy changes may upset the portfolio balance and

cause changes in asset prices, which would in turn prompt further changes
in the real economy.

A decrease in the credit-market interest rate reduce

borrowing costs and has expansionary consequences, while a reduction in
the price of claims on existing real capital is contractionary to the ex
tent that such a reduction prompts substitution away from new real capital
While the portfolio-balance method is certainly not unique to mone
tarists, the nature of the portfolio relationships assumed by Brunner
and Meltzer is.

They include three separate asset markets:

money, credit and physical capital.

those for

The credit market encompasses the

demand for and supply of credit, or equivalently, the supply of and de
mand for credit instruments, such as government securities.

The market

for physical capital consists of the. demand for, and supply of claims on
already-existing real capital, namely equity capital.

The inclusion of

the credit market makes for added institutional realism.

Open-market

purchases of government securities by the central bank, for example, lead
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not only to an excess supply on the money market, but simultaneously to
an excess demand on the credit market.
Take an increase in the supply credit instruments, such as might
follow from an increased fiscal deficit.

Assume that the credit market

interest rate, RS, is determined primarily on the credit market, and the
yield on real capital, RK, is determined mainly in the money market.
Thanks to Walras’ law (Chapter 2), we can ignore the real capital market.
(As mentioned above, wealth effects can be ignored for the purposes of
this short run.)

The increased supply of securities on the credit market

will raise RS, prompting a reduction of demand on the money market, and
therefore a lower RK.

The increase in RS has a contractionary effect;

the decline in RK has an expansionary effect.

Assuming away later feed

back between the two markets one concludes that these conflicting results
cast a doubt on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, since the net port
folio effect of a debt-financed increase in government expenditures
could be contractionary.
The consequences of monetary policy are as intricate.

Take an ex

pansion in money supply, and to avoid the complications of open market
operations, assume that it is delivered by a helicopter drop.

Again

assume that RK is determined mainly on the money market, RS on the
credit market.

The increase in the money supply will reduce RK.

demand for securities will decline, bringing down RS.
both RK and RS has an expansionary effect.

The

The reduction in

Note however that these

results depend crucially on the nature of portfolio relations assumed.
Take the opposite, extreme case, where RS is determined on the money
market, while RK is determined on the credit market.

The increase in

money supply will reduce RS, and the consequent rise in demand for
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securities will pull RK upwards.
tractionary.

The latter effect is, of course, con

Monetary policy is no longer unambivalently expansionary.

Brunner and Meltzer presume strong substitutability between money
and real capital, and weak substitutability between money and other
financial assets— a presumption which contributes to their assertion of
the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Alternative assumptions— particu

larly the assumption of proximity of money and the credit markets— lead
to very different results.
There is, of course, more to the monetarist argument than these
substitutability assumptions.

B. M. Friedman presents this straight

forward overview, in the context of a discussion of the strength of
fiscal policy.
In a general model including money, bonds, and capital, there
is no justification for presuming a_ priori whether the port
folio effect associated with bond-financed government deficits
offsets or reinforces the familiar income effect of fiscal
policy.
Whether this portfolio effect is positive or negative
depends on a crucial but simple relative substitutability con
dition: portfolio crowding out (or crowding in) results when
the ratio of the substitution coefficient between bonds and
money to the substitution coefficient between bonds and capital
is smaller (greater) than the ratio of the respective wealth
coefficients of the demands for money and capital. If the two
ratios are precisely equal, there is no portfolio effect, and
the traditional IS-LM analysis is adequate to describe bondfinanced government deficits.
If portfolio crowding out does occur, in general it can
. . . offset more than all of the standard income effect of
fiscal policy.12
The wealth coefficients refer to the partial derivatives of the demand
for money and separately, the demand for capital, both with respect to
wealth.

One benefit from Friedman's synthesis is that it ties the port-

folio-balance argument neatly to the more conventional IS-LM approach.
Since the primacy of monetary policy is a hallmark of monetarism,
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the next task is to assess the links between the portfolio relationships
assumed by monetarists, on the one hand, and their microeconomic neo
classical foundations— if any— on the other.

But first, a look at the

portfolio-balance method in general.

The Price of Capital
Crude Keynesian practice is to make the rate of investment a func
tion of the interest rate.

However, an authentic microeconomic approach

would denounce this as an ad hoc procedure.

1 *3

What really varies with

the rate of interest is not the rate of investment, but rather the
capital stock desired by the firm, and therefore in the aggregate by
all firms.

Correct economic calculation starts from a comparison of

the cost to the firm (or the price) of an additional unit of capital
with the

change in total revenue which accrues to the firm if it

acquires the additional unit of capital.

The former is a stock vari

able, but the latter is a flow, which stretches over time— over the life
of the capital good.

The increase in revenue has to be converted into

a stock, to make possible a comparison with the increase in cost.

Here,

we do use the rate of interest but not directly in the determination of
the rate of investment, but merely to translate the extra flow of ser
vices into the stock-equivalent marginal benefit to the firm, and then
use the latter to find

the optimal capital stock.

The transition from

one such stock to the next is compatible with an infinity of possible
rates of investment.

Of the latter, the one which achieves flow equili

brium will be that for which the supply price of capital equals the
market price.

Complete, stock-flow equilibrium is achieved with stock

equilibrium on the demand side, flow equilibrium on the supply side.
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The latter would be taken care of, in a general equilibrium model,
by the theory of the firm, and in this case, the firms involved would
make up the capital-producing industry.

Macroeconomic models such as

Brunner and Meltzer's which, as mentioned above, separate the "aggrega
tive” from the "allocative," stop short of any microeconomic modelling.
But the inclusion of both the interest rate and the price of capital
as the stations through which the transmission channels operate is a
more correct procedure, from a neoclassical microeconomic standpoint,
than if only the interest rate were considered.
The use of both the price of' capital and the interest rate as
indicators of policy is not unique to monetarists.
Tobin and B. M. Friedman use this procedure too.

Such Keynesians as
This is another ex

ample of the tendency among many Keynesians to minimize, or to compen
sate for their deviations from the neoclassical.

At the same time, its

use by monetarists reflects their tendency to follow the neoclassical
tradition.
Our next task is to address the broader question:

is there a neo

classical precedent for the monetarist assertion of the short-term
primacy of monetary policy?

Neoclassical Theory and the Short-Term Primacy of Monetary Policy
There is an ideological connection between the neoclassical microeconomic model and the potency attributed by monetarists to monetary
policy.

Neoclassical theory with its favorable treatment of market

processes lends itself quite easily to the arguments of the political
right.

Activism in fiscal policy is not usually the province of right-

wing conservatives, who tend to view its distributional non-neutrality
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less favorably than they would view the consequences of monetary policy.
To the extent that the right wing react negatively to all Keynesian
claims for fiscal policy, there is a superficial,- political link
between the neoclassical school and monetarist view of monetary policy.
But what about a theoretical connection?
an important theoretical link.

On one count, there is

In the neoclassical microeconomic

model, monetary changes are exogenous.

So also in the monetarist model.

And one of the portfolio-substitutability assumptions of monetarism
emerges automatically from the assumption of exogeneity.

A close link

between the money and credit markets would bring about a Radcliffean
weakening of central bank control over the supply of monetary or money
like aggregates.

That kind of proximity between the two markets is

excluded by monetarism.
Monetarism presumes instead a portfolio closeness between the
money and real capital markets.

But the assumption of a perfect capital

market places the equity market squarely in the real sector.-^

Although

equity holdings, like securities, are financial assets, sales and pur
chases of equity are regarded in portfolio theory as tantamount to
purchases and sales of the physical capital which the equity lays a
claim to.

Put differently, portfolio theory does not recognize any

distinction between the ownership and management of firms and the real
capital inside them.

Therefore the assumption of portfolio proximity

between money and equity is simply a restatement of the presumption
of the strong influence of money on the real economy.

Unlike the

portfolio separation of the money and capital markets, this assumption
is not rooted in neoclassicism.

As will be emphasized below, neo

classical microeconomic theory, while stressing the long-term quantity
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theory, said nothing about the short-term effects of monetary policy.
The short-term predictions of monetarism can have little to do with
neoclassical microeconomic theory.
The manner in which the assertion of the exogeneity of money be
comes translated into specific portfolio relationship in the monetarist
model suggests the compatibility of monetarism with the neoclassical
model.

Can one go a step further and state that the relative potency

or reliability of monetary policy is a necessary product of any macroeconomic theory rooted in the neoclassical tradition, such as monetarism?
In other words, is this characteristic of monetarism, like the first
three characteristics, an essential result of the hard core and the
positive heuristic of the parent program?

Or is it merely compatible

with them, and can it therefore be relegated to the protective belt?
The latter characterization is, I believe, the correct one.
It should be emphasized that the neoclassical microeconomic model
is entirely a study of long-run comparative statics, while monetarism
deals primarily in the short-run periods in between.

It will be recall

ed that the neo-Walrasian model in Chapter 2— or any other neoclassical
general-equilibrium monetary model, for that matter— has nothing to say
about what happens between one equilibrium and another.

And it is this

period which sees the macroeconomic transmission process unfold.

The

neoclassical microeconomic tradition has no bearing on any macroeconomic
conclusions concerning the potency or reliability of monetary or fiscal
policy in the inter period.
To summarize, the monetarist use of the portfolio balance approach
follows

the

neoclassical tradition, particularly in its use of the

price of capital as an additional indicator of policy and in its
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separation of the money from the credit markets.

But the conclusions

concerning the relative potency of monetary policy depend on more than
these considerations.

They also depend on short-term wealth effects of

monetary and fiscal policy, the short-term income effects and additional
short-term aspects of portfolio substitutability.

About these, and about

the short-term potency of monetary policy, neoclassical microeconomic
theory has nothing to say.
The section entitled "New Research Programs" below, will suggest
that a conservative macroeconomic program includes monetarism as a con
stituent theory.

The neoclassical bias and the macroeconomic orienta

tions are crucial ingredients of the program, and they are therefore
reflected in the program's hard core and positive heuristic.

But the

monetarist assertion of the short-term primacy of monetary policy is not,
and is therefore relegated to the protective belt.

Crowding Out and Ultrarationalism
A more detailed look at the IS-LM model sheds further light on the
relative strength and reliability of fiscal and monetary policy, and will
also serve as a transition to our next topic— the rational expectations
hypothesis.

In the IS-LM setting, one can distinguish between three sep

arate effects at work.
diture.

Take a bond-financed increase in government expen

The first is the direct fiscal effect on aggregate demand, repre

sented by an expansionary rightward shift in the IS.

There there is the

crowding out of private investment as the interest rate rises along the
LM (following the shift in the IS). Thirdly, the increase in the public
holdings of government securities prompts wealth-induced shifts in both
the IS and the LM.

The shift in the former is expansionary, that in the
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latter is contractionary.

With all these conflicting effects, the net

result is hard to determine on a priori grounds, especially if one’s
objective is a comparison with the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Yet Blinder and Solow insist on an a_ priori

solution, and set up

an IS-LM model, complete with wealth effects and a C. Christ-style
government-budget constraint.

On the basis of their model, they con

cede that judging by the first two effects, bond-financed fiscal policy
is weaker than monetary policy.

Income will rise by less, as will

receipts by government (at existing taxrates).

tax

And for that very

reason, and also because bond-financing commits the government to future
interest payments, "the budgetary gap is harder to close. . . .

It

therefore takes a greater rise in income to induce tax receipts suffici
ent to close the budgetary gap."

They conclude that "not only is

deficit spending financed by bonds expansionary in the long-run, it is
even more expansionary than the same spending financed by the creation
of new money."15
Unfortunately, their definition of the long-run— merely requiring
that the government's budget be balanced— is likely to leave monetarists
unconvinced of Blinder and Solow's conclusions.

Had the "long-run"

incorporated notions of taxpayer rationality and of the economy's auto
matic tendency toward full-employment or a "natural" rate of unemploy
ment, the conclusions would have been very different, and more akin to
those reached by the Ultrarationalists. ^

The latter hold that the

private sector is automatically crowded out by an increase in govern
ment expenditure, regardless of how it is financed.

The private sector

correctly anticipates future tax liabilities which inevitably will
result from increased government borrowing.

As a result of this

extraordinary degree of rationality on the part of taxpayers, fiscal
policy leaves aggregate income unchanged.

Ultrarationalism is to active

fiscal policy what the rational expectations hypothesis is to active
monetary policy.

The Rational Expectations Hypothesis
The concept of money illusion helps us to understand, from a neo
classical point of view, a major Keynesian departure from neoclassicism.
It refers to the tendency of economic agents to calculate in nominal
rather than in real terms— to measure their income, for example, in
monetary terms rather than in terms of the claims it represents over
physical products.

The term "money illusion" implies that the use of

money clouds the perception, as

it were, and hampers the ability of the

economic agent to measure variables accurately.

Expansionary monetary

policy, for example, would raise prices, but the money illusion would
keep employees from asking for a higher wage.

Whether economic agents,

if they had the requisite information, would reason in real terms is
beside the point.

To a neoclassicist, the crucial point is that their

behavior is irrational:

neoclassical theory uses the substantive form

of rationality and that assumes the transmission of adequate informa
tion.
The postulate of zero homogeneity of real variables in prices and
income, and therefore the equation of exchange and the principle of the
neutrality of money, went out the window with Keynesian economics.

It

could not longer be argued that an increase in the stock of money leads
to a proportionately equivalent increase in all prices.

Rather, expan

sionary policy could change relative prices (thanks partly to money

illusion) and therefore employment and output.

However we observe in

the literature various attempts at salvaging the homogeneity postulate
and reconciling the Keynesian to the neoclassical.

For example, some

would maintain that the homogeneity postulate applied to all variables
measured at their actual levels, but that some aspects of behavior were
dependent upon expected levels.

In other words, a basic premise of neo-

classicism was compromised in order to gain acceptability by Keynesians.
Some of the more eloquent attempts at the Keynesian-neoclassical recon
ciliation can be found in the literature of Phelps and company.^

An

example is Clower's explanation of the Phillips’ relationship between
inflation and unemployment, an explanation also used to reconcile the
monetarist vertical version of the Phillips curve to the conventional,
downward-sloping Keynesian interpretation.

The explanation revolves

around a disparity between employers and employees with respect to the
speed at which they adjust their expectations about the rate of price
inflation.

Employees' expectations change more slowly, and as a result

their wage-demand lags behind the real wage as correctly (or, at least
more correctly) perceived by the better-informed employers.

The conse

quent increase in employment appears to be at best a short-run remedy,
but then the Keynesian configuration never asked for more.

The Keynes

ian objective is to try to stabilize cyclical fluctuations, and after
all, cycles are short-run phenomena.
The point being made here is that much of the theoretical adjust
ment to neoclassical theory was in the presumptions about psychology of
behavior.

The major development in this context was the adaptive

expectations hypothesis.

According to the latter, expectations adjust

gradually to actual values, with the change during period t in the
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expected level of a variable being a constant function of the differ
ence, in period t (or, alternatively, t-1) between the actual and the
expected value of the variable.
In contrast, there is the rational expectations hypothesis (REH),
which totally obliterates the potential for activist policy.

The REH

predicates that expectations are formed in exactly the same way as the
theory makes its predictions.

The appellation "rational" is widely

accepted among economists, and the task of this section is to interpret
the meaning of the term and to relate it to our earlier concept of
substantive rationality (Chapter 1).

It will be argued below that the

REH ignores the complicated procedure in which mass psychology forms its
expectations and replaces it with the presumption that theoretical pre
dictions and mass expectations are one and the same.

This is not to

imply that merely because it uses the procedural type of rationality
(also in Chapter 1), the adaptive expectations hypothesis is necessarily
correct.

However, by its very ad hoc nature, it at least recognizes the

complicated nature of the matter and makes a weak attempt at an approxi
mation.
To elaborate on the REH, consider this simple model put forward by
M u t h , ^ who was inspired by the observation that "the average of expec
tations in an industry is more accurate than naive models and as
accurate as elaborate equation systems."

Let C stand for consumption

and Y for production; let p represent prices, pe expected prices, all
measured as deviations from their respective equilibrium levels.

Then

suppose consumption is a function of current prices, while production
is determined by expected prices:
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The term u stands for the error term.
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From the above, it follows that

1
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With Eu^ = 0 and no serial correlation, the price level predicted by the
theory is
„

Ep =
*t

b pe
at

where, again, pe represents the price level expected by economic agents.
Muth adds that, "Information is scarce and the economic system
generally does not waste it"; it follows that, "if the prediction of
the theory is substantially more accurate than the expectations of the
firm, . . . there would be opportunities for the 'insider' to profit
from the knowledge," until the "aggregate expectation of the firms is
Ofl

the same as the prediction of the t h e o r y . I n

n
other words, Ept = p^,

which (assuming b/a ^ -1) will be true only if pe = 0.
t

This means that

the price expected by the public will be the equilibrium price.
procedure drastically simplifies the problem at hand.

This

Were it not for

the assumption of rationality, Ep^ = pe , and the consequent p® = Ep^ =
0, the theorist would face the task of figuring out how expectations
are formed:

Ep (the price predicted by the theory) would depend on the

manner in which pe (the price expected by the public) is generated.
With a serially correlated error term, Muth shows that the price ex
pected by the public becomes a geometrically weighted moving average of
previous prices:
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and "the 'coefficient of adjustment' in the expectations formula
[depends] on the demand and supply coefficients."^

This scenario is

not possible under the REH, since persistent error as manifested in a
serially correlation error term is certainly at odds with rational
expectations.22
The implications of this type of model for macroeconomic theory
are very serious.

For an active policy to be effective, expected prices

must lag behind policy-manipulated, actual prices.

This means that the

authorities must aim at and achieve a growth rate in prices which out
strips expectations.

If the expectations of economic agents are

rational (in the REH sense), actual and expected prices would be identi
cal, and policy would therefore be fruitless.
Originally proposed by Muth in 1961, the rational expectations
appeared under a new name in 1970:

Burmeister and Dobell called them

myopic expectations, but the new name never caught on.
sense, rational expectations are myopic.
expectations once again.

23

And in a

To see this, take adaptive

Here the expected value of a variable is

formed on the basis of present and past values of the variable, accord
ing to some system of weighting.

As the weight attached to the present

period increases, expectations become closer and closer to the rational
in that at the limit, when the current actual value has a weight of one
(and therefore the formation of expectations is myopic), expected and
actual values are identical.

Expectations adjust instantaneously and

smoothly to reality so that the actual, expected and predicted levels
of a variable become one and the same.
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Yet-the simplicity of this logic hides a potential flaw.

A lay

man would point out that various theorists, each holding to a different
theory about how the economy works, could all use the rational expecta
tions hypothesis in their models.

Expectations would then be formed

in a different manner in each one of them, and yet they would all be
"rational."

This argument would be trivial were it not for an under

lying problem which it reflects.

The REH distinguishes between the

predicted level of a variable and its expected level, whereas there
are really three:

the actual level, the level predicted by the theory

and the level expected by economic agents other than the theorists.
The REH assumes that the expected level equals the predicted level of
the true theory.

Misspecification is assumed to be randomly distri

buted around the true theory.

Two conditions need to be met for such

a perfect market in information to emerge:

(1) From among the theories

tested by economists, the "best" one will emerge and become accepted
throughout the economy.

(2) Since the actual and the predicted values

must be the same, the "best" theory must also be the perfect theory.
This requires that the available information must be adequate for the
"best" theory to be the "correct" one too.
Benjamin Friedman
mation requirements."
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writes that there are essentially two "infor

The first is the information exploitation assump

tion, which asserts that "people will exploit information until the
point at which its marginal product equals its (perhaps zero) marginal
cost."

The second is the information availability assumption, which

requires that "people not observe or know in advance the value of cer
tain economic variables, but also draw, on the basis of these known
values, inferences which are identical to the inferences of the process
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actually generating the outcomes in question."

This second assumption

boils down to the following two statements, (1) economic agents have
access to the relevant data, and (2) economic agents either have the
correct economic model or they generate predictions as if they had the
correct model.
It is now time to return to the distinction made earlier (back in
Chapter 1) between procedural and substantive rationality.

The complex

problems faced by econometricians in their day-to-day work are an
example of the procedurally rational technique, where the objective is
to devise and implement a way in which

(or a procedure by which) to

achieve some objective, in this instance that of generating accurate
predictions.

Likewise, the person who is about to make an economic

decision might have to make up his mind as to which of the currently
available forecasts to use.
stantive type of rationality.

The REH, on the other hand, uses the sub
In our earlier terminology, the problem

is set up in a single-exit fashion, where economic activity in the for
mation-marketing system ensures that the economic agent has a choice
between the perfect and correct forecast and all the incorrect ones,
and the decision is, very predictably, to choose the former.
In the latter situation, any form of policy is doomed to failure.
For example, as mentioned above, monetary policy could be effective only
as long as it is able to open a gap between actual and predicted values.
It turns out, however, that an implication of the rational expectations
hypothesis is that even in the short-run, any deviation between actual
and expected values will consist purely of the so-called white noise.
In other words, any such deviation is totally independent of policy.
As a result, active policy is impotent, even in the short-run.^
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This brings us back to the axiomatic, neoclassical world above,
where there was no short run and there was no room for policy in what
was an entirely microeconomic world.

The

macroeconomic short-term

policy niche which has been of concern to economists particularly since
Keynes does not exist.
Some economists have attempted to find room within this sort of
theory for an effective short-term policy.

In one such attempt,

9 fi

it

has been noted that in econometrics, the estimate of a parameter will
approach its true value but only as the sample size increases.

Econo

metricians often use the rolling-sample technique, where older data are
discarded as newer data becomes available.

The justification for this

procedure is that the specification of any model is only an approxima
tion of the true economic structure and that such an approximation
becomes less and less valid as the time frame expands with the sample
size.

The consequent need to limit the time-span implies that the

econometrician might never achieve a sample size large enough for the
estimate to ever "reach" the true value.

There is a need to limit the

sample size, and yet there is also a need to have a large enough sample
size.

It follows that the perfect model, and therefore truly rational-

agent expectations are unattainable; this is then used to justify a
hybrid form of adaptive expectations which would allow for a short-run
effectiveness of policy. ^
What makes all this particularly relevant for our purposes is the
apparent contradiction between substantive rationality and macroeconomic
theory.

The relevance of macroeconomics is achieved only as the theory

moves from the substantively to the procedurally rational, away from
perfect rationality and the rational expectations hypothesis, a
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transition which appears to run parallel to the move from the microeconomic to the macroeconomic.

Monetarism and the REH
Monetarism has traditionally presumed that expectations take a
while to catch up with the economic consequences of a change in policy.
Hence the presumed initial impact of monetary expansion on real vari
ables, such as output, and only later on the price level.

The reason

for this is that in the aftermath of an expansionary policy spurt,
agents may expect an unchanged inflation rate and therefore the public
reacts by increasing real output.

However, since the unemployment rate

cannot be reduced below its natural rate, this real expansion is short
lived.

But this interregnum where the policy-makers get away with a

reduction in unemployment, while recognized by monetarists, is not com
patible with the REH, where the expected price level does not wait
before catching up with the actual price level.
But how significant is this difference between monetarism and the
REH?

Monetarists generally recognize the short-term potency of policy,

but still do not recommend the use of activist, interventionist, policy
for short-term or any purpose.

Because of the indeterminacy of time

lags and the fuzziness of the transmission mechanism, activism will not
attenuate but instead will worsen the ups and downs of the business
cycle.

In the short-term, unemployment may be reduced, but the overall

destabilization might end up worsening the underlying, natural rate of
unemployment.
indeed harmful.

To that extent, policy intervention is not futile but
On this count, then, I would conclude that there is no

operational difference between monetarism and the REH.
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But, on another count, a significant difference appears.

Monetar

ism, despite its microeconomic foundations, is a macroeconomic science.
In a sense, as Mayer argues, it is more aggregative than Keynesianism.
On the other hand, the REH is minimally macroeconomic.

If adherents of

the REH had their way, macroeconomics as we know it would disappear.
Given the confrontation with the Keynesians, macroeconomic equipment is
de rigueur.

But it should come as no surprise that literature emanating

from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis makes a stir for a return
to the general equilibrium model.

Wallace lashes out at both monetarist

and Keynesian econometric models, accusing both of being partial-equilibrium models, little more than a hodgepodge of correlations, with the
ad hoc theorizing lacking the proper theoretic-behavioral foundations.
This allegedly shows up in economic agents persistently committing the
same mistakes, as in the formation of expectations in the adaptiveexpectations formulation in such models.
. . . [It] could be the case that the structure during the
sample period (including government policy) was such that the
best forecast of the future price level is the current price
level— often called static expectations. But such a scheme
would not be best if for whatever reason, possibly a different
government policy, the price level turns out to increase as,
say, 7% per year. A model that implicitly assumes that people
forecast as if the price level takes a random walk around a
zero trend when, in fact, it has a nonzero trend is a disequili
brium model. ^
What the REH does, of course, is to apply the equilibrium concept to the
generation of expectations.

With regard to the problems in macroecono

metric models, Wallace advises against tinkering with the available
models, and recommends a wholesale switch to "microeconomic general
equilibrium theorizing and modeling."
One can easily foresee the upcoming swing in academic economics
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back toward substantial microeconomic detail.

tJhat will perhaps dis

tinguish these future models is the recognition that analysis of policy
calls for an emphasis on the stochastic dimension of the relevant prob
lems .
In sum, then, the natural tendency for a discussion of monetarism
to extend into the REH follows for a variety of reasons.

The REH may

be interpreted as a restatement of various aspects of monetarism, but
in stronger terms.

There is in both the same denunciation of policy

activism, the same allegiance to the equation of exchange.

Politically

and ideologically they are stablemates.. But the role of microeconomics
is far greater in the REH.

Monetarism was a shot in the arm for macro

economics, particularly after the Keynesians ran into difficulties.
The macroeconomic tradition may be in trouble if REH spreads around.

New Research Programs
It is now time to fit monetarism and the REH into their appropriate
research programs.

The macroeconomic character of monetarism suggests

that the neoclassical microeconomic program of Chapter 1 cannot contain
monetarism as a constituent theory.

But that same program contains no

propositions which are inconsistent with the REH, which can therefore
be regarded as one of the theories generated by the positive heuristic
of that program.
Monetarism, like Keynesianism, fails the first postulate of the
Latsis' neoclassical microeconomic program on page 15.

Economic agents

cannot be presumed to be omniscient in a monetarist model, unless these
agents are understood to be macroeconomic agents, or policy-makers.
(This is, in fact, where monetarism differs

from the REH.)

It has to
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be stressed that the microeconomic agent of Latsis’ neoclassical research
program is a different character from the agent of monetarism, who is
primarily the macroeconomic policy-maker.
The research program whose constituent theories include monetarism
is also not the Keynesian one of Chapter 3 (page 66).

In particular, the

policy suggestions of one program differ significantly from those of the
other:

they are truly competing programs.

The monetarist program acknow

ledges the well-functioning nature of market processes:

the Keynesian

program does not and the absence of such an acknowledgement is evident in
the hard core and positive heuristic of the Keynesian program and needs
to be rectified in the construction of a rival program.

So a conservative

macroeconomic research program is suggested below, from which monetarism
is spun off as one member theory.

This new program retains from Latsis'

neoclassical microeconomic program the emphasis on the stability and
well-functioning nature of the market mechanism.

But it does compete with

the same program in that it uses a different, macroeconomic, theoretical
equipment.

It borrows this apparatus from the Keynesian program, but it

differs from the latter in its regard for the market system, and it com
petes with it in its policy recommendations.

It cannot be called a mone

tarism program, because it could possibly generate more than just mone
tarist theories.

Instead, its label as a conservative macroeconomic pro

gram comes from its two major qualities which set it apart from competing
programs.
Its hard-core reads:
(i) The market economy is inherently stable and self-regulating,
while its positive heuristic goes as follows:
(a) Construct macroeconomic models, equipped to analyze
macroeconomic policy issues, including those relating
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to the interequilibrium period.
(b) These models will be as compatible as possible with
the microeconomic theory of general equilibrium.
As suggested above, monetarist predictions concerning the potency
and reliability of monetary policy (usually made in the context of a
comparison with fiscal policy) are not necessary products of the hard
core and the positive heuristic just predicted.

Hence those particular

predictions, while crucial to monetarism, belong only in the protective
belt of the program.

This particular point is discussed further in

Chapter 5.
In contrast, the REH is not incompatible with any of the proposi
tions in the hard-core of the neoclassical microeconomic program, and it
meets every instruction of the positive heuristic of that program.

The

decision-makers referred to in propositions (i), (ii) and (iii) of the
hard core can now be interpreted as being either microeconomic or macroeconomic.

All that is required is that the term "decision-makers" be

less rigidly interpreted than in Chapter 1.

The substantive rationality

with which microeconomic agents are endowed in the neoclassical program,
and the ensuing situational determinism, come out intact in REE:

pro

positions (b) and (c) of the positive heuristic of the neoclassical
program, like all the other components of that program, are fully honored
by the REH.

It is, of course, true that the REH is generally discussed

in the context of the debate about macroeconomic policy but this does not
make it a macroeconomic theory.

For one thing, the logical implication

of the REH is that there is no interequilibrium period, no short run:
this automatically disqualifies the REH as a macroeconomic theory, in
the conventional interpretation of the word.

The REH has, of course, a
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major macroeconomic implication in the sense that it leaves no scope
whatsoever for activist macroeconomic policy.

But its use in macro-

economic models is not different from any other use of the implications
of the neoclassical general-equilibrium theory in a macroeconomic dis
cussion.

The REH is essentially a rewriting of the Walrasian general-

equilibrium model, with added emphasis on issues relating to the trans
mission of information.

«
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In economics, theory is tested not merely by its predictive ability
(broadly speaking, the type of testing shared with the natural sciences),
but also in the course of time by the degree of political success earned
by the policies inspired by the theory.

From that follows the procedure

of distinguishing between theories not only on the basis of the nature
of their theoretical method (for example, whether they are macroeconomic
or microeconomic), but also by the political flavor of their policy
recommendations.
No theory can be all-inclusive:

comprehensiveness is cut down as

the theorist selects, on a priori grounds, the more important variables,
and between these the more vital relationships.

Keynesian theory

operates primarily at the macroeconomic level, while the more ideologi
cally conservative theories tei.d towards the microeconomic end of the
spectrum, and automatically make stronger assumptions about the ration
ality of economic agents.

The degree of detachment from the macro-

economic as well as the severity of the psychological assumptions
increase as the theory veers away from the study and formulation of
short-term activist policy.
Monetarism has very few good words for macroeconomic activism.
Still, its tools of analysis are principally macroeconomic and one of
its major concerns is the role of monetary processes in the periods
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between equilibria— a period where microtheory leaves a void— and its
assumptions about microeconomic rationality are much less rigid than
those of neoclassical microeconomic theory.

For these reasons, Chapter

4 made monetarism a member of a conservative macroeconomic program.
The rational expectations hypothesis, on the other hand, leaves
no room whatsoever for policy activism, and in line with the pure
theory of comparative statics has no short run.

Like the ultraration

alist school in fiscal theory, the REH has dramatic implications for
macroeconomics:

to wit, macroeconomic policy is totally futile.

It

does not breach any of the propositions of Latsis' neoclassical pro
gram, and it was identified in Chapter 4 as a member of that program.
Like microeconomic general-equilibrium theory, it manifests situational
determinism at the level of the microeconomic agent:

the substantive

form of rationality is used in the generation of expectations accord
ing to the rules of the REH.

The hypothesis itself generates some

macroeconomic implications of the general equilibrium model, and what
makes these macroeconomic conclusions stand out is the situational
determinism at the microeconomic level, a determinism brought about
by stringent assumptions about the psychology of microeconomic agents.
If one defines macroeconomics simply as the study of aggregate
variables, the REH can be considered macroeconomic.

If however one

uses a neoclassically-oriented definition of macroeconomics— as the
study of the macroeconomic-policy determination of macroeconomic vari
ables in the disequilibrium, short-run period— then the REH is not
macroeconomic.

In particular, it shows no concern with the short-run,

which can be regarded from the neoclassical point of view as a province
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of macroeconomics.

Admittedly, it does concern itself with macro

policy, to the point of saying that macropolicy is entirely futile.
But using Lakatosian terminology, one can suggest' that the future of
the REH, to the extent it stays at the forefront of a progressive neo
classical research program, lies in the elaboration of microeconomic,
general equilibrium models.
This almost brings us back, full circle, to the neoclassical mone
tary model of Chapter 2, except that the latter not only stressed the
futility of activist policy (as does the REH), but went a step further
and asserted the irrelevance of all policy.
Situational determinism pervades mainstream economic theory.

At

the microeconomic level, the adoption of the substantive form of ration
ality leads to the single-exit solutions of microeconomics.

From the

neoclassical point of view, Keynesian macroeconomics makes much weaker
assumptions about rationality.

But even so, Keynesianism along with

monetarism show a situational determinism at the macroeconomic, policy
maker’s level.

The problem is usually set up in such a way that the

theory generates a clear-cut economic solution and the policy-maker
implicitly faces a clear choice between the optimal policy and the wrong
policy.

The solution is strictly an economic one, and the theory ab

stracts away from all non-economic factors (such as political or social
considerations) which might impinge on the policy-maker's freedom of
choice and make the economically optimal solution no longer such an
obvious choice.
Microeconomic situational determinism as used by Latsis defines
the boundary between economics and psychology.

The extension of the

concept to macroeconomics throws the emphasis on the boundary separating
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economics from the social sciences.
is perhaps in order.

On this boundary, a further comment

Students are repeatedly reminded during their

economics education of the vital distinction between positive or scien
tific economics, and untestable, value-laded normative economics.

Yet

during their careers most economists repeatedly make normative or pre
scriptive statements, of the type, "The federal government should . . ."
or "The Federal Reserve must . . .," or, "the President is making a mis
take in. . . . "
agents.

Many of these recommendations are directed at political

Very often, these same agents interact through the political

process (rather than through an economic or a market process, in the
narrow sense), even though the outcomes of these processes are of an
economic nature.

But economists persist in drawing a line of demarca

tion between themselves and political scientists.

It is of course true

that a model which attempts to cover everything in social science is
bound to be overburdened and worthless (in terms of its predictive
ability), but perhaps the boundaries of macroeconomics are drawn some
what too rigidly.
On the Lakatosian method, the reader will recall that this requires
a precise definition of the program in the form of a set of hard core
propositions and a set of instructions on how to construct theories
within the program.

This permits an accurate classification of theories

by program with all the benefits that such precision entails.

Member

ship in the monetarist program, for example, requires more than the
prescription by the theory of a monetary rule.

In linking monetarism

to its precedents, Chapter k emphasized the compatibility of monetarism
with neoclassical microeconomics— hence the right-wing ideological
basis of monetarism.

But Aschheim and Tavlas^ deny that monetarism is
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the "exclusive domain of conservatism," and support their argument by
citing such writers in the Chicago tradition as Paul Douglas, whose
writings show a "simultaneous allegiance to the quantity theory and to
left-wing i d e o l o g y . H o w e v e r , by the criteria of the conservative
macroeconomic research program formulated in Chapter 4, Paul Douglas
was not right-wing enough to qualify as a monetarist, his recommendation
of a monetary rule notwithstanding.
Stein writes, "conceivably (the monetarist) could be a Socialist
but not a Marxist, because a monetarist believes that . . . the price
system is an efficient allocation of resources."3

But since when do

Socialists acknowledge the well-functioning of free markets?

Obviously,

there are brands of socialism which insist on monetary stringency and
prudence, but that does not automatically entitle them to the label of
monetarists.

In Solow's^ lexicon, they perhaps fall under the category

of "little monetarists," whereas in this dissertation, monetarism is
described by its mainstream and logically-entailed features— what Solow
belittles as the "syndrome" of "Great Monetarism.”
The research-program methodology may also be useful as a predictive
tool.

It suggests that the propositions which are placed in the hard

core will be preserved as long as the program lives.

In contrast, pro

positions in the protective belt are easily shed when

they fail the

test of empirical corroboration.

Hence the value of the distinction

between the essential characteristics of the conservative macroeconomic
program and the propositions in its protective belt.

Unlike the former,

the latter are not essential to the survival of the program and may
become modified, or even jettisoned, over time as the evidence dictates.
Chapter 4 suggested that monetarism consists of a set of theories which
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are members of a macroeconomic conservative research program, whose hard
core and positive heuristic emphasize the macroeconomic nature of the
analysis as well

as its microeconomics theoretical underpinnings.

I

also suggested that the primacy afforded to monetary policy, while a
major characteristic of monetarism, is not crucial to the program as a
whole.

Even though it is a primary characteristic of monetarism, the

assertion of the potency and reliability of monetary policy (relative
to fiscal policy) belongs in the protective belt of the program.

The

implication is that should the prediction of the primacy of monetary
policy run into empirical difficulties, the conservative program may
still survive, without that prediction, and perhaps without monetarism
at its forefront.

The conservative right would still have a macro-

economic program at their disposal, as well as the neoclassical microeconomic program.
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J. L. Stein, "Introduction: the monetarist criticism of the new
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